

## Chapter Seven

### Turning to Asia: *The Clash*

**Anne L. Foster and Andrew Rotter**

Walkerton, Indiana was named for James H. Walker, a banker who in the middle of the 19th century helped build the Cincinnati, Peru, and Chicago Railroad. The CP&C ran through Walkerton. The town was planned by surveyors for the railroad; its track went straight, north and south, and as in hundreds of Midwestern towns, the streets of Walkerton were laid out on the strictest of grids, every turn a right angle. Walter LaFeber was raised in Walkerton. Its population, three years before he was born in 1933, was 1137. His father ran a grocery and dry goods store. Walt worked in the store from a very young age, stocking shelves and, eventually, managing the cash register. His close friend and colleague Thomas McCormick once said: “If you want to understand Walter LaFeber, you have to visit Walkerton, Indiana,” as McCormick told one of the authors (Rotter) he had once done.

LaFeber was not the only prominent US diplomatic historian to come from a small town. Lloyd Gardner grew up in Delaware, Ohio. William Appleman Williams, who helped train LaFeber, McCormick, and Gardner at the University of Wisconsin, hailed from Atlantic, Iowa—an aspirational place name if there ever was one. Wayne Cole, another Wisconsin PhD from the same period, came from Manning, Iowa, a town of 1800 people during his youth. And it was not only foreign relations Revisionists who hailed from small towns. Thomas A. Bailey, LaFeber’s MA supervisor at Stanford, was born on a prune orchard near San Jose. Cotulla, Texas, where John Lewis Gaddis was born in 1941, had a population of 3600 the previous year.

It may seem counterintuitive that historians interested in the place of the United States in the world would grow up in towns like Walkerton, Delaware, and Atlantic. Yet there are several possible reasons why this might not be a coincidence. First, it may be, as Gardner has suggested, that diplomatic historians came disproportionately from small towns because “there were not enough problems in small towns, so historians-to-be sought out the wider world--if even in historical imagination.”<sup>1</sup> Bright, curious youngsters might chafe against the limitations of small towns. They read and dream of far-off lands, creating for themselves a vicarious cosmopolitanism that offered intellectual and emotional release from their perceived isolation. This is a common enough expression in fiction and memoir—Jay Gatsby? Ronald Reagan?—and one that makes sense to Gardner from his own experience. Its lessons may apply most fully to historians with international interests, and perhaps with particular strength to those whose feet remain planted in the United States, unwilling or unable to detach from the home place entirely, but eager to look outward from it in the search for encounter, interaction, or comparison.

It is also worth noting that LaFeber, along with Williams, Gardner, and McCormick, grew up in the Midwest. David S. Brown has argued that historians “beyond the frontier” developed a uniquely regional perspective on United States history and the nation’s place in the world. Starting with Frederick Jackson Turner and continuing through Charles Beard, then to the Wisconsin historians John Hicks, Merle Curti, William Hesseltine, Fred Harvey Harrington (LaFeber’s graduate mentor, who was raised in upstate New York but moved to Wisconsin, and stayed), and Williams, these thoughtful Midwesterners developed a world view that embraced popular dissent in the service of grass roots democracy, a populism generally shorn of its sour impulses for racism and anti-Semitism, and a faith in community that far more closely resembled Portage, Wisconsin (where Turner grew up) or Papillion, Nebraska (Curti’s birthplace) than it

did Manhattan, New Haven, or Cambridge. To paraphrase John Quincy Adams, they went not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. There were monsters enough at home, in the form of unbounded *laissez-faire* capitalism, Eastern elitist hubris (usually found in liberal internationalists), and politicians whose commitment to democracy was no better than skin deep. The Indiana-born Beard and his Midwestern successors at Wisconsin crafted a critique of US foreign policy that, as Brown has written, “appealed to both a neo-isolationist right and an anti-imperialist left.” Their populism did not diminish their curiosity about the wider world.<sup>2</sup>

Yet the isolation of small towns and the cosmopolitan dreams they might have inspired can be overstated. The Walkerton, Indianas of the world were not nearly as distant from international networks or knowledge as the mythology of the frontier would predict. Having moved from the East Coast to the Midwest college town of Champaign, Illinois in 1999, the historian Kristin Hoganson set out to examine her new, smallish city, in search of the heart of the heartland. Seeking the local, she found instead the global, “the histories of foreign relations” and “a mesh of global entanglements stemming from searches for security and power.” She learned that it had long been thus; even in the 19th century, Champaign and its surrounding county had been closely connected to world markets and affairs apparently far distant, but in truth as present each day as the prairie wind.<sup>3</sup> Champaign, the city, was considerably more populous than Walkerton in 1930, but Champaign County was a good deal smaller than St. Joseph’s County, Indiana, which held not only tiny Walkerton but vigorous South Bend, a short drive away.

Common to both counties and towns was the railroad. In the late 19th century, the Illinois Central, underwritten by British capital, carried pork in its refrigerated cars from Champaign to Chicago and ports beyond, then ships conveyed it to markets in Europe, where prices for meat were fully a Midwestern concern.<sup>4</sup> In Walkerton, during the same era, C. W. N.

Stephens' General Store stood near the CP&C station. At its height, it employed twenty-two men, sold general merchandise, livestock, and grain, and occupied two stories of a storefront measuring 44 x 100 feet. Streets of the town were named Michigan, Virginia, and Georgia. They were flanked by large grain elevators—the Midwest's version of skyscrapers. By the 1890s, telephones were in use in most businesses and some residences, and at least several could be used for calling long distance.<sup>5</sup> Walter LaFeber & Son, Grocery and Dry Goods, was not as big as Stephens' store. But it sold a wide variety of products from many places, and it served as a gathering spot for the Walkerton community, a place where people met to shop and gossip.

The CP&C ran to Chicago, and it carried not just goods but passengers. Walter LaFeber often took the train to the Windy City to go to Chicago Cubs baseball games at Wrigley Field. His father had served in the Navy in France during the First World War, and he had evidently returned home with a sense of the world, as most soldiers and sailors did. His family recalls that LaFeber visited New York as a high-schooler, and that, in his sophomore year at Indiana's Hanover College, he spent a semester in the United Kingdom, which according to family members left a lasting impression. Hanover offered a wide-ranging liberal arts education delivered by dynamic classroom teachers like LaFeber's mentor, Robert E. Bowers, who urged him to pursue graduate work in history, first at Stanford and then at the University of Wisconsin. Whatever the mythology of the Midwestern small town boy, it is clear that Walt LaFeber had a curiosity about the world "built in," as his son puts it.<sup>6</sup> He was no provincial. Like his father, he knew about the wider world.

LaFeber & Son may not have carried any Japanese items during the 1930s. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, as intended, put financial roadblocks in the path of US imports of many products from around the world, among them the silk that made up almost two-thirds in the value

of Japanese products that earned American dollars. Still, the Midwest was attached to Japan in other ways. Hundreds of graduates of its colleges and universities traveled to Japan as missionaries. University of Illinois agronomist O. H. Peabody learned Japanese farming methods during a three-year stint in Japan, then returned to teach them to Champaign County farmers.<sup>7</sup> St. Joseph's County had a visitation of a different sort: the arrival from Japan in 1830 of the invasive plant species autumn olive, which overwhelmed some native specimens by blocking the sunlight they needed to thrive.<sup>8</sup>

It is unlikely, of course, that young Walter LaFeber was aware of these many connections between Japan and his native Midwest. Indeed, Asia as a whole played a limited role in LaFeber's teaching and scholarly interests, at least prior to 1975. The exception to this was China, about which the "Wisconsin school" showed a great deal of curiosity, and about which McCormick wrote his dissertation and first book, *China Market*.<sup>9</sup> LaFeber himself brushed against East Asia in his first book, *The New Empire*, which considered the run-up to war with Spain and the burst of overseas imperialism that accompanied it, including the annexation of the Philippines in 1898.<sup>10</sup>

Readers of that book, or of the chapter about it in this volume, will know that its focus is on domestic economics and politics in the United States, and that its secondary concerns are the European imperial powers, Spain, and Cuba, not the Philippines itself. LaFeber's subsequent publications included edited books on the diplomacy of John Quincy Adams and the Cold War--each of which includes some material on US relations with Asia--and monographs on the Cold War largely in Europe, the US response to revolutions in Central America, and the Panama Canal.<sup>11</sup> In a series of short articles published between 1968 and 1970, three in *Current History* and one in *The Nation*, LaFeber considered the US exercise of power in Asia, with a focus on the

triangular relationship among the United States, Japan and China. In 1975, LaFeber published “Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942-1945,” in the *American Historical Review*. The article’s title suggests its emphasis, which was on high policymaking in the United States and Britain, not so much on Indochina—a portmanteau place name conferred by imperial France. Excellent and much-cited, the piece nevertheless appeared to be a one-off, for after its publication he turned his attention to Central and South America.<sup>12</sup>

As was often the case, part of the spur for a turn to Asia by LaFeber came from current events. There was, of course, the war in Vietnam. And then, starting in the late 1970s and reaching fever pitch in the 1980s, many Americans feared that Japan, their erstwhile protégé after World War II, was bent on and poised to overtake the United States, at least economically. Harvard professor Ezra F. Vogel’s *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America*, was among the most provocatively titled and carefully argued (and therefore probably least read) of a series of articles and books trumpeting Japan’s rise.<sup>13</sup> More popular was Michael Crichton’s novel *Rising Sun*.<sup>14</sup> The *Kirkus Review* caught the essence of the book and of the moment in US-Japan relations: “The Yellow Menace returns in Crichton’s shocking, didactic, enormously clever new mystery-thriller—only now he wears a three-piece suit and aims to dominate America through force of finance, not arms. ‘The Japanese can be tough,’ says one character here. ‘They say “business is war,” and they mean it.’”<sup>15</sup> Sayuri Shimizu, who worked on *The Clash* with LaFeber while she was finishing her PhD at Cornell, recalled that the publisher approached LaFeber about the possibility of providing more robust historical context to the US-Japan relationship than journalists and other political commentators were writing.<sup>16</sup>

There are some hints that LaFeber’s interest in Japan was growing even before that ask. In 1993, he published *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913*, the second volume in

the four-volume Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations.<sup>17</sup> The book required a broad ambit, given its function in the series and its chronological scope. Its index cites Japan on thirty-seven different pages. That compares with eight citations for France and twenty-one for Germany. It may be that these years, involving the advent of the Meiji Emperor, Japan's economic growth, and its military victories over China and Russia, the latter mediated by Theodore Roosevelt, simply demanded this emphasis. Or maybe the chance (or the need) to learn more about Japanese policy during these years piqued LaFeber's interest in the longer-term US relationship with Japan, the patterns that shaped the years of his study and those that emerged from it. In any case, *The Clash* would become his next book.

The book has twelve chapters along with a preface and conclusion. LaFeber begins the story in 1850 and concludes it in the 1990s. He explains in his Preface that the title refers to the fact that while the US-Japan relationship over the nearly 150 years covered in the book seemed mostly cooperative, with the obvious exception of 1931-1945, in truth the relationship was full of "sometimes highly dangerous clashes," since the two nations had "two different forms of capitalism."<sup>18</sup> The two nations clashed most frequently in or over China. The first seven chapters cover the years 1850-1941, and the subsequent two chapters treat World War II and the Occupation. LaFeber dispatches the years 1951-1990s in three chapters. This simple observation reveals much about one of the main arguments of the book: since its formal inception in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, continuity more than change has characterized US-Japanese relations. LaFeber makes the continuity of clash clear in the preface, but other continuities reveal themselves in the narrative.

The first two chapters, covering the years 1850 to 1900, introduce the theme of cultural misunderstanding. This theme characterizes the relationship throughout the book, although the

nature of misunderstanding changes, and it is complicated by the desire some people from each country have to learn about the other. Americans and Japanese, although Americans more forcefully and with more harmful consequences, have racial views shaping their interactions with each other and with other Asians. Chapter one tells the “opening of Japan” story a bit differently from what high school history typically teaches, demonstrating that by the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, Japanese officials were seeking the most sensible way to engage with the rest of the world. US actions did force their hand, but the Japanese also saw the US effort as their best opportunity to structure their broader engagement on their own terms. In chapter two, LaFeber argues that the relatively low level of actual contacts during 1868-1900, as each nation worked more on internal matters than expanding power in Asia, resulted in “never better” relations.<sup>19</sup> LaFeber has written about these late 19<sup>th</sup> century years many times from the US perspective. His interpretation of US actions does not change much from that in *The New Empire* or *American Search for Opportunity*. Japan and the United States have a competitive affinity in these chapters.

Already in chapter three, covering 1900-1912, and then even more in chapter four (1912-1920), the affinity is fading in the face of the competition. Both nations expanded their territorial holdings in Asia during these years. The United States claimed to be expanding to support its Open Door policy, serving its ever-increasing demand for markets for its goods. Japan more frequently closed doors where it expanded, wanting to assure access to both raw materials and markets in the hard-won colonized spaces. During these years, competition was particularly fierce over investment in Manchuria, a region rich in resources that Japan needed, and a location of significant development. Expansion in the same region was likely to prompt competition in any case, but the overt racism of US immigration policy, and in the ways Japanese immigrants to the United States were treated, caused friction. After California attempted to require segregated



“Oriental” schools for Japanese, Chinese and Korean immigrants in 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt negotiated a compromise to prevent that, but at the cost of a Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan that would limit further immigration to the United States. Japanese officials agreed, but understood what the Agreement signaled. Relations became so contentious that each country drafted war plans aimed at the other.<sup>20</sup>

Officials in both Japan and the United States worked on ways to demonstrate both power and peaceful intentions, and through World War I, managed peacefully. Potential problems arose again in the aftermath of that war, when Japanese officials sought what they believed was their due as an Allied power and great nation: land and rights in China, Germany’s former possessions in Asia, and a racial equality clause. President Woodrow Wilson, constrained by both his racism and his concern for traditional US policies toward China, tried to thwart Japanese ambition. He only halfway prevailed, but that was sufficient to alert Japanese officials that the United States was more stumbling block than equal.

In the subsequent three chapters, five (1921-1931), six (1931-1937), and seven (1937-1941), the conflicts grow. During the 1920s, the United States had the upper hand and used its power to continue to restrict Japanese ambitions. LaFeber spends twelve pages to discuss the Washington Conference of 1921, one of the longest sub-sections in the book. This conference represents well the American vision for world order after World War I. The United States got nearly everything it wanted out of the conference. The Anglo-Japanese alliance ended. Japan agreed to build fewer capital ships than Britain or the United States, in return for access to US capital markets. All participating nations agreed to respect the Open Door in China. So long as US capital flowed, each nation prioritized financial development over political or military power,

and both Britain and Japan subordinated their interests to what the United States found acceptable, peace reigned.

The US vision for the world would not prevail for long and abruptly collapsed with the onset of the Depression. During the early 1930s, US capital ceased to flow. The Japanese responded by prioritizing political and military ambitions, although whether they did so in service of or instead of financial ambitions depends on one's point of view. Much of chapter six reveals the inadequacy of US policy tools for confronting a nation, in this case Japan, which had stopped subscribing to the US view of the world order. Expansion into China and a closed economy initially seemed to help Japan, which had lower unemployment and faster growth than the United States. But as LaFeber writes, the Japanese decision to join Germany and Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 "began a five-year era in which Japan moved from weakness to weakness and the United States moved from weakness to strength."<sup>21</sup>

Japan's direct clashes with US interests in China revealed that Japan was more dependent on the United States, its market, its capital, and its technology, than it had recognized. In 1937, the United States was not yet prepared to capitalize on this Japanese weakness. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's disastrous attempt to balance the federal budget caused more economic distress, the depression deepened, and dissension erupted among policymakers and politicians about the exercise of US power. Chapter seven, covering only 1937-1941, reads like that section of a tragedy when all the actors know they are walking toward their doom, yet they cannot take steps in any other direction. LaFeber takes the reader through the painstaking transformation both policymakers and the public went through in these years, coming to grips with the realization that FDR's preferred method for ordering the world, US economic power backed up by exhortation and diplomacy, had completely failed.

The other critical part of this story is Japan's dependence on imported raw materials, and what Japanese policymakers believed they needed to do to preserve their access. As LaFeber notes, in Japan, the militarists' solution, "to cordon off large parts of Asia to obtain economic self-sufficiency," increasingly won out during the late 1930s. In the United States, disputes between officials with more experience in China and those with more experience in Japan meant that the United States continued to pursue both negotiations with Japan and military support for China after 1937. Negotiations revolved, as always, around China. Japanese officials insisted that their troops must stay in China. US officials insisted that they must leave. At stake? Who got to trade with and invest freely in China, and it turned out only war could settle that question.

Coverage of the war years 1941-1945 is a familiar story well told. LaFeber emphasizes the disparity in resources, how scarcity drove Japan and abundance enabled the United States to pursue military strategies and choose diplomatic policies leading to defeat for one and victory for the other. Even while emphasizing that the United States fought to destroy closed economic blocs and to promote "free markets globalized," LaFeber also highlights the pernicious effects of race on the war in Asia, noting that many US officials believed that unless Japan was "destroyed to the point of unconditional surrender," it would rise again to lead the rest of Asia to oppose all white people. The anti-Japanese sentiment prompting the US government to send Japanese-Americans, but not German-Americans or Italian-Americans, to concentration camps the Americans called relocation camps, is also part of the war story in *The Clash*.

The bulk of this long chapter focuses on the interplay between military strategy, which after mid-1942 was shaped by the knowledge that the United States was in position to win the war even if it might take some time, and by plans for the postwar world, which still looked to be a contentious one. China, Britain and the United States had different visions for world order in

postwar Asia, and US officials even quarreled among themselves. All the US officials agreed, however, that this time the US vision would be backed by more than diplomacy and economic power. As the war in Europe wound down in spring 1945, and Josef Stalin began to make plans to honor the Soviet pledge to enter the war against Japan, hints of the full scale of postwar conflict began to emerge. The new US president, Harry Truman, scrambling to make sure that the war ended on US terms and with the United States prepared to occupy Japan alone, authorized the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The US effort to transform Japan into the shepherd of the US order in Asia during the postwar Occupation is the story of chapter nine, which covers just 1945-1951. LaFeber evokes the seesaw emotions of 1945, with jubilation at victory and elation at the massive amounts of US economic, military and political power vying with fear about Soviet intentions and the levels of poverty and destruction in Japan, China, and Europe needing to be addressed immediately, as well as latent worry about a resurging depression. In Japan, US officials moved to completely remake politics and the economy during the immediate postwar years, but continued economic turmoil, concerns about disorder worldwide, and growing Soviet power prompted a more conservative turn after 1947. As LaFeber argued, Japan was “less an end in itself than the means...for achieving the larger regional and global purposes of US foreign policy.”<sup>22</sup> Japanese views and voices are muted in this chapter compared to others, although reading carefully reveals that Japanese officials were biding their time and influencing what they could. The outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula made the Japanese task easier, so much so that LaFeber quotes Japanese prime minister Yoshida Shigeru as calling the conflict “a gift from the gods.”<sup>23</sup> The United States needed a stable, prosperous Japan more than it needed a democratic Japan; it

also needed lots of supplies for the US effort in Korea. Both US needs helped Japan's economy recover and its politicians reassert their authority.

The last quarter of the book, three chapters, covers the years 1951 through the mid-1990s. Another historian, tasked as LaFeber was with providing context and correctives to anti-Japanese commentary in the 1980s, might well have written primarily about World War II and the years after. He devoted only a small portion of his book to these years, demonstrating in the first three-quarters that the misunderstandings had a much longer history. These chapters are as lively as the rest of the book. LaFeber calls the 1950s "the pivotal decade."<sup>24</sup> Japanese officials carefully maneuvered to run especially their economy but also their foreign relations to suit Japanese rather than US interests. Having learned the lessons of the 1920s very well, they made sure that domestic companies could get sufficient Japanese capital and not have to rely on foreigners. Japan also began as early as 1952 to pursue trade relations with the People's Republic of China, a move the United States did not relish. US policymakers still held many cards, including the fact that the United States provided military protection, raw materials, and a market for Japan.

In many ways, the chapter on the 1950s, and then the one covering 1960-1973, recall the economic contention between the two countries in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, as each had a different vision for how to interact with and develop China. The stage was bigger now, since Japan and the United States also had important interests in Southeast Asia as well. Neither country sought political control over places supplying raw materials or markets, but both sought to promote their own ways of doing business in order to profit both their companies and their nations. It was, in some ways, a return to the competitive affinity of the very early 20<sup>th</sup> century, tipping, as then, into pure competition after the mid-1960s when Japan began consistently to run a positive trade

balance against the United States. The final full chapter, covering the years 1973 until the time the book went to press, explores those years when Japan's economic successes coincided with US weakness in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam, resulting in US fears that Japan would surpass the United States in global power. Japan's factories were producing high quality, desirable consumer products from televisions to video recorders to cars at a good price, but Japan was facing its own growing pains from corruption at home to conflict abroad over the best way to deal with a resurgent China or protests in Southeast Asia. LaFeber uses the mutually beloved sport of baseball to explore cultural affinities and conflicts in the mature US-Japan relationship of the 1980s and 1990s. The United States and Japan no longer competed to see who could control China, and instead traded ideas about how best to handle the rise of Chinese economic power in the early 1990s, a fitting end to this particular story.

*The Clash* was one of three winners of the Bancroft Prize in 1998. Reviewers praised the book for its range and comprehensiveness. Writing a "Featured Review" in *Diplomatic History*, Charles E. Neu lauded *The Clash* as "the fullest account of American-Japanese relations ever written," and called it a "thoughtful, richly detailed analysis."<sup>25</sup> Nicholas Kristof, who (like several others) reviewed *The Clash* alongside Michael Schaller's *Altered States*,<sup>26</sup> told readers of *Foreign Affairs* that LaFeber had brought "a fresh eye and a wonderful historical sweep to his work," while Mark Beeson called the book "a masterly survey of the historical interaction between Japan and the United States."<sup>27</sup> That LaFeber was a US foreign relations historian, rather than a Japan expert, offered the advantage (according to Carol Gluck, herself a Japan expert) "of distance from the afflictive claustrophobia of many Japan specialists," presumably such as herself.<sup>28</sup>

Yet the reviews were hardly uncritical. The reviewer for the *New York Times* found the book, at over 400 pages of text, heavy going.<sup>29</sup> Edward Drea pointed to weaknesses in LaFeber's treatment of military history—vital, he said, to an understanding of the US-Japan relationship over time.<sup>30</sup> Gluck and other reviewers recognized that LaFeber was not a Japan expert, and while that was not in their view altogether a drawback, it did lead, according to E. Bruce Reynolds, to some errors in LaFeber's account of pre-Meiji Japan. Neu pointed out that *The Clash* neglected important themes, such as the role of American missionaries in Japan, the interaction of popular culture, the images held by elite groups, or the misconceptions and misunderstandings bred by the great chasms between the two cultures.” Kristof detected a category error that led to an over-focus on politics and diplomacy to the detriment of sociological and anthropological perspectives and, in a backhanded compliment, praised LaFeber for writing “so knowledgeably without the benefit of the Japanese language that I wondered why any of us ever bothered to slave away over it.”<sup>31</sup> China, in LaFeber's telling the main object of the clash between the United States and Japan, was treated as a passive country, what Gluck called “a more or less inert object of competing imperial attentions,” an especially serious shortcoming in light of events at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and a poor predictor of diplomacy in the new millennium.<sup>32</sup> Eileen Scully's long review in *Reviews in American History* picked a variety of bones with *The Clash*, most significantly with its title (and thesis), which flirted with “teleology” in its insistence that “every interaction between the two [nations]—even if ostensibly cooperative—embodies, portends, and accelerates their inevitable collision.”<sup>33</sup> The *American Historical Review* and the *Journal of American History* evidently did not commission reviews of *The Clash*, probably because it was published by a trade press.

LaFeber surely anticipated some of these criticisms. He knew that his lack of Japanese language limited his understanding of half the relationship. He thus relied entirely on Sayuri Shimizu to choose Japanese documents appropriate to the study and to translate them. Shimizu remembers, fondly, that LaFeber trusted her to do this work, but adds that he called her frequently to press her on the nuances of her translations. It was, she recalls, an impressively rigorous process.<sup>34</sup> LaFeber conceded that his perspective was, as William Appleman Williams had once admitted (and celebrated) about his own, “a view from the provinces.” For that he would not apologize. As always, he was unwilling to depart from the conviction that the analysis of power in the 20<sup>th</sup> century must begin with the United States.

Nevertheless, LaFeber was at pains to avoid provincialism, to channel not just Walkerton but South Bend, Chicago, New York, and London. He also knew the book was dauntingly long. While it was still in draft form, he wrote to one of the contributors to this volume: “Few people will read the book. It is now about 600 pages (instead of the original 800), so I doubt if I’ll want to read it again myself, LaFeber quipped. “Too bad -- there is a good story and some instructive morals buried in the relationship, and I might have gotten them out in the open if I had not lost control of the thing. Never had this kind of problem with a book before.”<sup>35</sup>

LaFeber’s interest in getting the translations right, in telling the story fully from the Japanese side, followed his process from his previous work. He sought expert help from friends, colleagues, and students, immersed himself in the literature, spoke with experts, and visited Japan several times. *Inevitable Revolutions*, first published in 1983 but with a greatly expanded edition in 1993, also dove deeply into Central American history, resulting from the same kinds of reading, consultations, and visits. In that book, LaFeber’s goal was to understand “the impact of U.S. policies on the peoples and institutions of Central America.”<sup>36</sup> In *The Clash*, the story is



more reciprocal, showing impact in both directions. In this sense, it demonstrates the promise of international history. The book also took twice as long to write as he expected,<sup>37</sup> which may be a cautionary tale for international historians.

The contrasting biographies of US and Japanese leaders featured in several chapters of *The Clash* both reflect the still-traditional approach in this book, focused as they are on the individual leaders and their potential to effect change, and the effort to explain historical developments from both sides. Chapter four, covering the pivotal years 1912-1920, opens with vivid descriptions of Japanese leader Yamagata Aritomo and US President Woodrow Wilson. Both men had been shaped by political upheaval taking place in their youth, which both saw in part as stemming from racial contention, although they perceived that contention in different ways, naturally. For each, assuring political stability at home depended in part on exerting sufficient power overseas.<sup>38</sup>

Japan and the United States clashed in significant ways between 1912-1920, over immigration, the racial equality clause Japan championed at the Paris Peace Conference, and in their different visions for China. The backgrounds of Yamagata and Wilson helped shape the nature of those disputes and their resolutions. Rarely did history see a pair of leaders so instructively matched in background and outlook. In later chapters, too, compelling biographies help illuminate the history, as in the chapter ten discussion of Kishi Nobusuke, Japanese prime minister, and his efforts to help navigate a particularly tense time in US-Japanese relations in the mid-1950s.<sup>39</sup> LaFeber drew attention to Kishi's ardent nationalism, his love of aspects of American culture, and his shrewd ability to maneuver through a variety of difficult situations throughout his career.

LaFeber's efforts to understand both sides stretch beyond biography. Given that at least part of the impetus for writing the book was the crude criticisms of Japan in the 1980s from US pundits, it is not surprising that the chapters on 1960-1973 (when Japan first began consistently to run a positive trade balance with the United States after 1966) and 1973-1990s (when Americans began to believe Japan had potential to overtake the United States economically) pay particular attention to the Japanese rationale for following economic as well as political and strategic policies which ended up benefiting Japan significantly more than the United States.

In the midst of the US war in Vietnam, for instance, Japan carefully began looking for ways to distance itself from the United States. It joined ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, even providing one-fifth of the initial funding. As LaFeber wrote, US officials "absorbed in Vietnam" completely "missed the importance" of ASEAN.<sup>40</sup> Conflict only grew from that point. LaFeber recounts how Japanese officials were "confused" by statements from President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, seeming to indicate Japan should perhaps acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>41</sup> *The Clash* still has as its primary purpose explaining how and why the United States acted as it did in relationship with Japan, but more than his other works, it also represents the views and goals of Japanese officials for that relationship.

Because *The Clash* concerns US-Japan relations, it is in one sense as traditional a study as they come in the foreign relations subfield, Revisionist branch, of course, in which subtitles tended to offer some small variation on "The United States and [Your Choice of Other Country Here]." It is, in many respects, vintage LaFeber. Despite having the breadth and feel of a textbook, its sources include, as most of his books do, archival documents, in this case from Washington, New York, Princeton, Cambridge (MA) and New Haven, and every presidential library from West Branch, Iowa (Hoover) to Austin (Johnson). Its emphases are economics and

diplomacy. Make no mistake: *The Clash* follows the Revisionist playbook, in which problems are mostly caused by America's material overreach and a Japanese reply in kind, call and response, and strategic crises follow especially from the US-Japan rivalry in China, where both nations pursued their own visions of an Open Door for trade. The entries in the book's index are mainly names, places, and periods. The images it contains are mostly cartographic, or photographic reproductions of Great Men, Americans and Japanese: "maps and chaps." The prose style of *The Clash* is, in the judgment of the authors, some of the best LaFeber ever wrote. It is direct, conversational without being loose or chatty, evocative, clear, and witty. There are notes of Thomas Bailey in LaFeber's storytelling, though not in his analysis. One can assume accuracy in rendering source materials; no one needs to fact-check Walter LaFeber.

But look closer. The book also demonstrates the ways in which LaFeber was grappling with changes in the profession, particularly the effects of the end of the Cold War, the development of what was then called international history, and the nascent cultural turn. In some ways, though, the most unusual quality of *The Clash* is that it is his only book focusing solely on the full chronological sweep of a bilateral relationship.<sup>42</sup> This particular canvas, geographically focused and chronologically broad, allowed LaFeber to paint the full scene as he envisioned it. Economic motives provided the broad brushstrokes, but culture, race, and strategy filled in the colors. LaFeber was skeptical of the newer developments, the purported end of the Cold War, international history, and the cultural turn, but as always, curious about them. He argued in 1992 that thinking of the Cold War only in terms of a post-1945 US-Soviet struggle was too limited, and he drew attention to continuities in US foreign relations since the 1890s.<sup>43</sup>

We can perhaps infer his sentiments about international history, as it was then called, from the many probing questions he asked one co-author of this essay in the early 1990s, as she

pursued an international history approach in her dissertation. His obvious skepticism seems to have stemmed from two suspicions. First, he represented the best of a traditional kind of scholar, someone who returned again and again to similar themes and topics, investigating them ever more deeply and from a variety of angles, to try to answer puzzling questions about a place. That place, for him, was chiefly the United States. How did the United States, with all its many contradictions, become what it is, and particularly how did it come to exercise power in the world as it did, and with what consequences for the polity? He seemed to think that an international history focus might lead easily to divorcing the study of foreign relations from deep investigation of the societies creating those relations. He was prescient, in some ways. Many scholars today deploy technology and reasonably good funding to conduct research in more archives and countries and languages than they can possibly deeply study.

His second suspicion centered on the ways that international history developed in the 1980s and 1990s, focused more on politics and strategy than economics. International history, as more recent scholarship demonstrates, is eminently compatible with a focus on economic motives, but that was not the trend in the 1990s. What is perhaps most impressive, though, is that LaFeber was grappling with these developments at all. He had no real need to, as an eminent senior scholar. But his own curiosity and his relationships with a wide range of scholars prompted his openness to at least considering new approaches.

In his Acknowledgments, LaFeber thanks many scholars—he was always generous — including a number of Japanese, and we know that he and his wife, Sandy, went to Japan a number of times. His son, Scott, recalls LaFeber conversing about Japan with the eminent foreign relations historian and US-Japan specialist Akira Iriye.<sup>44</sup> The book begins by contrasting the cultures of Americans and Japanese--the people, not their nations. Americans were, as

Alexis de Tocqueville saw them: restless, striving, acquisitive, noisily democratic, and bent on maritime trade. The Japanese valued “consensus and harmony.”<sup>45</sup> LaFeber makes numerous references to culture, broadly defined, in the text. He discusses films—*Patria*, *Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo*, *Godzilla*, and Akira Kurosawa’s peculiar *Rhapsody in August*--and cites Walt Whitman and Lafcadio Hearn.<sup>46</sup> He quotes at some length Townsend Harris, the first US consul to Japan, who described what he considered the peculiarities of Japanese life, including the bats, rats, and spiders with whom he cohabited, and the pervasive, and to him distressing, nudity of the people at toilet.<sup>47</sup> (19). When a Japanese delegation first came to the United States in 1873, its leader, Iwakura Tomoni, made sure to avoid the cultural *faux pas* of bringing along his preferred clothing and condiments, and the Japanese noted with dismay the “boldness and coquetry of American women.” (38-9). LaFeber mentions baseball (63, 356), and the excited reception in Tokyo of Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet (90-1) and the summer Olympics in 1964 (338). Americans believed the Japanese were conformist and often inscrutable (348). The Japanese deplored what they saw as the casualness of American violence (400).

The index of *The Clash* contains fifty discrete page references to race, a category of analysis not generally associated with Revisionism during most of LaFeber’s career. He clearly takes seriously the racial aspects of US-Japan relations. He describes American and Japanese struggles to place each other along the ladder of civilization, a racialized concept, and one both societies believed in deeply. There were moments in the relationship particularly susceptible to mutual misperceptions based on racism. During the first visit by a Japanese delegation to the United States, in 1860, Japanese were subject to racist taunts, as when one Philadelphian asked a US naval officer “...is that your monkey you have got with you?”<sup>48</sup> The racialized misperceptions were pervasive and could be subtler than references to monkeys. Japanese

observers often commented on the lewdness and lack of discipline among Americans, while Americans expressed surprise when Japanese demonstrated knowledge and initiative.

The heart of the dilemma was Japan's ambition to join the ranks of great powers as an equal, which included an ambition to be an Asian imperial power. As they steadily achieved that ambition, they attracted both grudging admiration and racialized scorn. As LaFeber reported the words of Finley Peter Dunne's character Mr. Dooley: "A subjick race is on'y funny whin it's raaly subjick. About three years ago [1904] I stopped laughin' at Japanese jokes."<sup>49</sup> Mr. Dooley evoked Japan's growing power in the Pacific, but in the United States, Japanese faced school segregation in California, a Gentleman's Agreement to end that segregation leading to de facto exclusion of Japanese immigration, with that exclusion codified in the 1924 Exclusion Act, as well as anti-Asian riots. Race was deployed to restrict Japanese global ambitions. Woodrow Wilson feared threats to the "white race" as he considered committing the United States to war in 1917, and at the Paris Peace Conference, he took extraordinary steps to defeat Japan's proposed racial equality principle for the Covenant of the League of Nations.<sup>50</sup>

Such measures demonstrated to Japan that the great power club would never be open to them. They set about achieving their ambitions on their own, an effort ending in World War II, a struggle shaped by race and racism. Japan claimed that the purity of the Japanese race meant Japanese were uniquely qualified to rule Asia, and regarded the Americans as dirty. Americans were equally racist. LaFeber quotes the famous war correspondent Ernie Pyle as saying, "...the Japanese were looked upon as something subhuman or repulsive." This sentiment was reinforced by the President Roosevelt's Executive Order creating the so-called relocation camps for Japanese and Japanese Americans on the West Coast.<sup>51</sup> Even after the American victory, racism persisted. LaFeber notes that as late as 1989 in Rhode Island, an effort to end the

celebration of Victory Day (colloquially called Victory over Japan Day) drew people wearing “American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars paraphernalia” and using racist epithets.<sup>52</sup> The pervasiveness of racism and racial imagery shaped relations between Japanese and Americans, although in *The Clash*, anecdotes and examples tend to speak for themselves. LaFeber does not explore their meaning and effect at length; race is perhaps not quite a discrete category of analysis for him.

*The Clash* was published just as an influential group of historians were turning to culture—again, broadly conceived—as a way of explaining US foreign relations. Cultural history itself was having an extended moment. Borrowing from anthropology, most notably the Weberian cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who defined culture (both productively and confoundingly) as “webs of significance,” historians increasingly told stories about common folks, finding meaning in their everyday practices, religious rituals, language, and gestures.<sup>53</sup>

Foreign relations historians found ways to apply cultural history to their own practices. They were open to using sources then alien to those in the field, among them fiction, visual images, notes in the margins of texts, and accounts concerning diplomatic etiquette or the expression of emotion. To some, this meant investigating non-state actors and their organizations. Others saw culture inscribed in the actions of the state itself. Michael Hunt’s influential book *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, published a decade before *The Clash*, borrowed from Williams the analytical category ideology, which Hunt couched in cultural terms, praising Geertz but shying away from substituting “culture” for “ideology,” evidently because the former lacked sufficient parsimony or rigor.<sup>54</sup> Others proved less hesitant. Some argued that categories of analysis such as race, gender, and religion, were part of the larger construct of culture, being ways of weaving webs of significance or creating “structures of meaning,” another

Geertzian definition.<sup>55</sup> The interdisciplinary field of cultural studies had a role here too, insisting on interrogating the United States as an empire, not unlike other empires—an argument congenial to the Revisionists, though the ponderous use of theory and often abstruse language of cultural studies scholars limited their influence on foreign relations historians.<sup>56</sup>

Walter LaFeber was not a foreign relations culturalist. His references to culture were broad, subject to binary descriptions that an unfriendly critic might today scorn as “essentialist.” Again and again, *The Clash* advanced Revisionist arguments, such that there was no mistaking the centrality of economic factors in its analysis. Convinced that power mattered most and that it inhered only in the state, aware of the cultural turn in the field, and doubtless aware that some of his students and former students were at minimum curious about it, LaFeber seems to acknowledge it without endorsing it. At one point, discussing the early John F. Kennedy administration’s policy toward Japan, he writes: “The two cultures might have appeared to be converging, but foreign policies do not always follow culture.”<sup>57</sup> Summing things up at the end of the book, he adds this: “That much of the conflict is due to centuries-old cultural differences is apparent. Other causes, however, are too often lost. There is little culturally based about US free trade, ‘one-world’ policies after 1945.”<sup>58</sup> The final sentence of *The Clash* declares that “the primary cause” of conflict between the two nations—“the centuries-old rivalry to decide which system was to lead in developing Asian and especially Chinese markets”—would remain the chief influence on US-Japan relations.<sup>59</sup> It could hardly be clearer: economics mattered most.

For LaFeber, culture was a feature of US-Japan relations, but it did not determine them, nor did it shape them significantly. Race, independent in his view of a larger cultural framework, helped to explain mutual misperceptions and likely affected behavior, as was the case after US immigration restriction and in battle during the Pacific War. It is tempting to



ascribe to LaFeber's analysis a belief in the culture of capitalism, the view that faith in private property and free enterprise and the relentless pursuit of foreign markets brought with it a way of thinking about the world. Or perhaps it was the other way around—that is, that capitalism, American-style, was predicated on an uncommon geography, certain habits of thought about democracy and individualism, and a particular sort of history that made for a peculiarly, if not uniquely, American culture.

As readers of chapter eight will discover, LaFeber's fascination with Tocqueville suggests something deeper than a belief in the crass desire for profit as the root of all foreign policy decisions.<sup>60</sup> Revisionism was never solely about economics. Students, in their own ways, of Beard, Harrington, Williams, and LaFeber were interested in how US domestic policy shaped the nation's foreign relations. Much of this had to do with economics. But not all. The Revisionists took ideas seriously, placing economics within the more spacious category of ideology—"Weltanschauung," as Williams called it. Harrington was interested in religion--his book was titled *God, Mammon, and the Japanese*--and Williams, too, understood the importance of religious thinking among American policymakers, writing that the first forty years of the twentieth century saw "the rise of a new crusading spirit in American diplomacy," which emphasized "the virtues (and necessities) of Protestant Christianity."<sup>61</sup> For his part, LaFeber would place the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr front and center in *American, Russia, and the Cold War*.

Walter LaFeber was a Revisionist to the end. Yet we might say he was, more emphatically, a small "r" revisionist, given his insistence on challenging accepted wisdom, whatever that might be. These traits are likely familiar to many small-town Midwesterners. LaFeber never abandoned his conviction that US foreign relations had their basis in material

factors, that the pursuit of an economic Open Door abroad was the predicate for an American empire that put aside the pursuits of liberty and modesty, as empires do, and that tragically eclipsed the quest for justice at home. But his mind, and his sensibility, were capacious enough to entertain more than one big idea at once. It has been remarked that, in his brilliant classroom lectures, Walter LaFeber dispensed a powerful radicalism while wearing a suit or coat and tie, an ideological wolf in the traditional sheep's clothing of the male academic.<sup>62</sup> So, too, did culture, and especially race, appear in *The Clash*: another way of thinking about foreign relations, another way of thinking otherwise, another part of what made Walter LaFeber so astonishingly appealing and influential.

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<sup>1</sup> Lloyd Gardner email to Andrew Rotter, June 21, 2021.

<sup>2</sup> David S. Brown, *Beyond the Frontier: The Midwestern Voice in American Historical Writing* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). Quotation on 129.

<sup>3</sup> Kristin L. Hoganson, *The Heartland: An American History* (New York: Penguin, 2019), xxvi.

<sup>4</sup> Hoganson, *The Heartland*, 106-7.

<sup>5</sup> History of Walkerton, <http://www.walkerton.org/wordpress1/history/#:~:text=Walkerton%20was%20named%20for%20James,store%20from%20nearby%20West%20York>. Accessed July 20, 2022.

<sup>6</sup> Conversation with Scott LaFeber, Anne Foster, and Andrew Rotter, August 29, 2022.

<sup>7</sup> Hoganson, *The Heartland*, 166.

<sup>8</sup> St. Joseph County Soil and Water Conservation District, "Invasive Species," <https://www.stjosephswcd.org/invasive-species>. Accessed August 15, 2022.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas J. McCormick, *China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1902* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967). Note that Fred Harvey Harrington's most famous book concerned US relations with Korea (and Japan). See Fred Harvey Harrington, *God, Mammon, and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1944).

<sup>10</sup> Walter F. LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963).

<sup>11</sup> Walter F. LaFeber, ed., *John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965); idem., ed., *The Origins of the Cold War* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971); idem. *American, Russia, and the Cold*

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*War, 1945-1966* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967, with nine subsequent editions); idem., *The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); idem., *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983).

<sup>12</sup> Walter F. LaFeber, "Our Illusory Affair with Japan," *The Nation* (March 11, 1968) pp. 330-338; "China and Japan: A Matter of Options," *Current History* 55 (September 1968), pp. 153-58, 179-180; "Before Pearl Harbor," *Current History* 57 (August 1969), pp. 65-70, 114; "China and Japan: Different Beds, Different Dreams," *Current History* 59 (September 1970), pp. 142-146, 179-180; "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942-1945," *American Historical Review*, 80 (December 1975), 1277-1295.

<sup>13</sup> Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).

<sup>14</sup> Michael Crichton, *Rising Sun* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992).

<sup>15</sup> *Kirkus Review*, March 10, 1992.

<sup>16</sup> Sayuri Shmizu, comment, Walter LaFeber Festschrift Workshop, Ithaca, NY, Oct. 29-30, 2022.

<sup>17</sup> Walter LaFeber, *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

<sup>18</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, xviii.

<sup>19</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 32.

<sup>20</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 89-91.

<sup>21</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 182.

<sup>22</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 271.

<sup>23</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 287. We follow here LaFeber's ordering of Japanese names, with surname listed first.

<sup>24</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 296. This is the title of chapter 10.

<sup>25</sup> Charles E. Neu, "Feature Review: American and Japan in the World Arena," *Diplomatic History* 23 (Summer 1999), 571-75 (571).

<sup>26</sup> Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

<sup>27</sup> Nicholas D. Kristof, "Japan's Full Story: Inside and Outside of the Cabinet," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1997, 141-45 (141); Mark Beeson, Review Article, *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 32 (2002): 267-75 (267).

<sup>28</sup> Carol Gluck, "A not so special relationship," *Times Literary Supplement*, June 26, 1998, 31.

<sup>29</sup> Sebastian Mallaby, "Uneasy Partners," *New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1997.

<sup>30</sup> Edward Drea, review of *The Clash*, *Journal of Military History*, 62 (October 1998): 924-25.

<sup>31</sup> E. Bruce Reynolds, review in *History*, 26, 4 (Summer 1998): 208; Neu, "Feature Review," 573; Kristof, "Japan's Full Story," 141, 144. Sayuri Shimizu recalls that Japanese area studies experts largely "shunned" *The Clash*. Sayuri Shimizu, comment, Walter LaFeber Tribute Workshop, Ithaca, NY, Oct. 29-30, 2022.

<sup>32</sup> Gluck, "A not so special relationship." See also Robert G. Kane's review in *Orbis*, 42 (Summer 1998): 480.

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<sup>33</sup> Eileen P. Scully, "Men, Maps, and Markets: First Causes and Last Resorts in US-Japan Relations," *Reviews in American History*, 26 (1998): 759-65 (762).

<sup>34</sup> Shimizu, comment, LaFeber Tribute Workshop.

<sup>35</sup> LaFeber to David Langbart, July 10, 1996.

<sup>36</sup> LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*, quote from p. 361 of 1984 edition; p. 421 of 1993 edition.

<sup>37</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 481.

<sup>38</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 101-104

<sup>39</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 314-321.

<sup>40</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 345.

<sup>41</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 349-350.

<sup>42</sup> It could be said that the book is actually about that triangular relationship LaFeber wrote about in the late 1960s, but in *The Clash*, while China receives sustained attention, it is acted upon rather than actor.

<sup>43</sup> Walter LaFeber, "An End to Which Cold War?" *Diplomatic History* 16 (January 1992): 61-65.

<sup>44</sup> Conversation with Scott LaFeber, Foster, and Rotter.

<sup>45</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 6-7.

<sup>46</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 24, 52-53.

<sup>47</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 19.

<sup>48</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 24.

<sup>49</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 88.

<sup>50</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 113, 123-34.

<sup>51</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 218.19.

<sup>52</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 381.

<sup>53</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5.

<sup>54</sup> Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

<sup>55</sup> For example, see Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

<sup>56</sup> An influential work making this argument in the mid-1990s is Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994). This scholarship influenced Foster's

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dissertation and later book: Anne L. Foster, *Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).

<sup>57</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 333.

<sup>58</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 399.

<sup>59</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 405.

<sup>60</sup> LaFeber, *The Clash*, 30-31.

<sup>61</sup> Fred Harvey Harrington, *God, Mammon, and the Japanese*; William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, revised ed. (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1962), 53.

<sup>62</sup> Andrew J. Rotter and Frank Costigliola, "Walter LaFeber: Scholar, Teacher, Intellectual," *Diplomatic History*, 28 (November 2004), 625-35 (628).