Reconstructing the Backstory: *America, Russia, and the Cold War*

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Walter LaFeber's imagination and ambition were fired by a brief comment George F. Kennan made in the early 1960s, deploring the lack of a "comprehensive work addressed to the entire span of Russia's relations . . . with the West." Jumping from lower case to all caps as he typed notes on Kennan's book, LaFeber declared: "WHAT I HOPE TO DO IS THIS, BUT ESPECIALLY TO VIEW IT FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE."[1] The necessities of teaching also played a motivating part. Unable to find good books for a planned seminar on the Cold War, he resolved to write one himself. As his wife, Sandy LaFeber, later recalled, "So he delayed the seminar for a year while he began the research for a book on America, Russia and the Cold War. He would write the book he felt necessary for students' understanding of this most important subject."[2] The result was *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, a masterpiece that has provided generations of readers with a deeper understanding of the the decades of hostile economic, ideological, and geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. Appearing in ten editions from 1967 until 2008, the volume reveals not only the trajectory of the conflict, but also the intellectual evolution of the author.

The book merits a wide-angled examination. First, it ranks as a stunningly successful commercial and classroom venture, influencing thousands of readers across multiple decades. Chapter titles, some persisting through all ten editions, encapsulated LaFeber's master narratives of the Cold War. "Two Halves of the Same Walnut" explained the link between the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine." "Korea: The War for Both Asia and Europe" laid out the stakes of the conflict. John F. Kennedy's "New Frontiers" could not escape "Old Dilemmas."

Second, the four decades between the first and the final editions span most of LaFeber's career, making the book a running commentary on his evolution as a historian and witness to a changing world. Third, reflecting the global and frequently all-consuming nature of the Cold War for international and American politics alike, *America, Russia and the Cold War* shines also as a concise history of US foreign relations in the six decades after 1945. The volume's "revisionist" interpretation stresses, especially in its first chapters, the clash between the communist and capitalist systems at the root of the Soviet-American competition and how that clash shaped US foreign policy.

A final aspect is the intellectual context of the book. Undergirding LaFeber's brilliance as a scholar and as a teacher was his wide-ranging engagement with other thinkers. LaFeber's personal library included books filled with marginalia recording his reactions to such luminaries as Carl L. Becker and Reinhold Niebuhr. In nurturing the intellectual development of his students, even after they left Cornell, LaFeber fostered another venue for discussing matters of the mind. He managed to find the time, often after midnight, to exchange ideas and information with these and other friends. Some of what he learned enriched *America, Russia, and the Cold War.* The book thus reflects and refracts, sometimes in surprising ways, LaFeber's mentoring, and the ways he was mentored.

This essay begins by examining aspects of the book in the context of the ideas and feelings of five scholars who influenced LaFeber's thinking. First was his graduate school mentor at the University of Wisconsin, Fred Harvey Harrington. The Wisconsin History Department, a powerhouse in American history during LaFeber's years there in 1956-59, also boasted William Appleman Williams, a second major influence. A former student of Harrington's, Williams proved an iconoclastic democratic socialist, the soon-to-be-famous guru

of the New Left, "revisionist" view of US foreign relations history. Though the oft-called Wisconsin interpretation appealed to LaFeber, he also maintained his independence from it, as he did from most movements. He had not gone to Madison intending to become a radical. He also retained some distance from another hallowed influence, Carl L. Becker, a star of the Cornell History Department from 1917-41, and Harrington's own undergraduate mentor.

Kennan served as a fourth influence. Though he and LaFeber differed in age, temperament, and attitudes toward power, both were lanky sons of the Midwest who mused about writing a great American novel. With both, a fascination with foreign policy trumped the ambition to follow their mutual literary inspiration, F. Scott Fitzgerald. Kennan and LaFeber had each hoped to use fiction to illuminate the problems of US society. They ended up channeling their ambitions into exploring the troubled past of US diplomacy. With regard to *America, Russia and the Cold War,* therefore, Kennan figures as the book's inspiration, as an instigator and then as a critic of the Cold War, and, finally, as a challenger of revisionist Cold War history.

Last but by no means least in this pantheon of influencers was Reinhold Niebuhr, the theologian whose exploration of the irony in American history, and in the human condition, profoundly appealed to LaFeber. Niebuhr's secular warnings about original sin and about the consequent perils of hubris and overweening power permeate *America, Russia and the Cold War* from the first edition to the last.

LaFeber leavened this potpourri of ideas with his own distinctive view of history—and of much else—internalizing Becker's famous premise that a professor is someone who thinks otherwise.[3] Indeed, LaFeber sustained in most aspects of his professional and personal life a degree of autonomy and distance. Despite his warm, affable, and outgoing personality, he shielded his inner persona, which some casual acquaintances mistakenly interpreted as aloofness.

Sincerely generous with his time and his attention, it was difficult to perceive that he was also smoothly setting the parameters of such interactions. If one ventured too far into LaFeber's domain by suggesting what he might do, or even by asking what he was doing or how he was feeling, the intruder might well encounter a polite but definite drawing of the curtain as he adroitly shifted attention back to his inquisitor. Most interlocutors, flattered by the attention, failed to notice the move. LaFeber remained, in this sense, the observer-participant who remained the observer. Perhaps owing to his being an only child, he felt feel most comfortable with singular action in which he retained the options.

Fred Harvey Harrington

LaFeber's inherent reserve militated against unrestrained feelings for anyone outside his family, but he made a near exception for his graduate school adviser. Fred Harvey Harrington employed a firm hand in directing his graduate seminars at Wisconsin, and decades later, LaFeber was still struck by the force of his mentor's personality and intellect. He stressed Harrington's "dominant voice" in the national university community, his "arresting presence," and his "energy-charged style."[4] A Harrington visit late in his life to Cornell, which included an appearance in LaFeber's senior seminar, revealed something his often-intimidated undergraduates could not imagine on their esteemed professor's face: the concern of a student still eager, after so many years, to impress his teacher anew.

Harrington inspired LaFeber's scholarship, including aspects of *America, Russia and the Cold War*. Disdaining labels, Harrington nevertheless pressed his graduate students to become revisionists, believing that rethinking was a necessary step in a scholar's development. He insisted they "break intellectual molds, to think the unconventional, to question the accepted,

and, perhaps above all, to deal with the roots, transformations, and effects" of American dominance in world affairs. In describing what Harrington insisted his graduate students do, LaFeber also summed up his own approach to *America, Russia, and the Cold War* as well to his other books.[5] "Through it all," LaFeber stressed, "one consistent theme reappeared apart from the manner. That theme was the influence of [Charles A.] Beard, and the understanding and sensitivity with which Harrington and other Wisconsin faculty used Beard's work."[6] Beard, the preeminent Progressive historian in the years leading up to World War II, challenged the unequal distribution of wealth and power in America while emphasizing democracy's ever-present need for reinvigoration. He famously stressed the importance of economic self-interest among the architects of the US Constitution in the 1780s, for example, and the continued self-interest of wielders of national power since.

Harrington challenged graduate students with a Beardian critique: "Where's the economics in your story?"[7] There certainly was economics aplenty in LaFeber's histories. Moreover, every edition of *America, Russia, and the Cold War* retained two paragraphs that, seemingly more attuned to historiographical loyalty than to Cold War history, defended Beard against such apologists for empire as the Harvard historian Samuel Eliot Morison.[8] Reluctant to embrace radical new ideological constructs both as a student then as a professor himself, LaFeber nonetheless ensured that more radical authors, like Beard and then Williams as well, received the respectful forum their ideas deserved.

William Appleman Williams – and George F. Kennan

Williams too stressed economic motivations in his histories of US foreign policy since 1890, arguing that Washington's primary aim was to expand and sustain an Open Door empire

that enabled the United States to export industrial and agricultural surpluses that could not be consumed at home. Harrington thoroughly approved and "handpicked" his former PhD student to return to Wisconsin when a new slot on its faculty opened.[9] Williams' reputation preceded him. LaFeber had already read the iconoclast's 1952 book *American Russian Relations, 1781-1947,* and informed his classmates, Gardner and Thomas McCormick, that their new teacher's text was highly critical of US policy, with a last chapter on containment aimed at Kennan. As teaching assistants for Williams, who was then writing his influential *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, the three graduate students grew fascinated with his challenge to conventional notions about the Cold War. Sandy LaFeber later recalled "evenings in Madison with Williams holding forth [on Russia] at his home, once at our apartment with Lloyd and Tom McCormick."[10] Witness to Williams' undergraduate lectures from the room's last row, McCormick would later tell one of the authors of this chapter that his logic was so well-reasoned and inescapable that to study with him meant accepting a fundamental premise: for all their talk of a special mission in history, American leaders had mouths to feed and coffers to fill, just like every nation and empire before.

Despite the allure of Williams and the ingrained appeal of his radicalism (radical for the 1950s, that is), LaFeber was always quick to clarify that he, like McCormick, retained Harrington as his primary adviser. Gardner chose Williams. The division remained long past their dissertations. Sticking with Harrington brought practical benefits as well. Moving into administration during those years, he encouraged his students to finish quickly. Moreover, Harrington's University of Wisconsin "Big Red Machine" had an especially enviable track record for placing freshly-minted PhDs. Those advantages loomed large for the LaFebers, who already had a child.

Although LaFeber learned from Williams and Harrington, he was not their acolyte. Invariably polite and habitually discreet, he often glossed over differences with those whom he respected. Nevertheless, he emphasized that "Harrington's personal ideology" was "framed much more by Beardian categories than by any New Left."[11] That distinction also applied to LaFeber himself, who maintained a respectful distance from Williams' broadest conclusions. It seems to have stemmed from a mix of personality and politics. LaFeber's personal copy of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* bore this inscription from Williams: "Don't frown so, Walt, this doesn't mean we have to have socialism."[12] Many years later, Gardner would recall a strain in some conversations with their mentor long after the trio graduated. Sometime "if we were all together with Bill, and a discussion took place, Walt and Tom clammed up and I was left to debate Bill. I guess they felt it wasn't worth it, or that I was the one who had worked with him, so it was my job to mount the challenges?"[13]

Some of those challenges centered on the history of US relations with Russia. One way to contextualize *America, Russia, and the Cold War* is to bring a key assumption of LaFeber's – the Cold War's near inevitability – into conversation with conclusions reached by Harrington, Williams, and Kennan. Whether serious conflict between America and Russia was avoidable remains the overriding question in the relations between these two giants since 1890. Could alternative paths chosen at critical historical junctures have circumvented most Cold War tensions? Was it possible for American leaders to work out a deal with Bolshevik Russia at the time of the Revolution? Was there a significant chance, as Franklin D. Roosevelt hoped, for postwar collaboration with Moscow after their wartime alliance of necessity? Did Josef Stalin's death, to borrow the title of Dwight D. Eisenhower's speech at the time, provide "a chance for peace"? Did Russia's experiment with democracy in the 1990s constitute a missed chance for

closer ties? In the final analysis, is the history of US-Russian relations more a tale of natural enemies or of botched opportunities?

Ultimately unanswerable, these questions nonetheless offer a framework for comparing the underlying ideas, assumptions, and wishes of these four historians. The conversation requires juxtaposing two challenges: first, the possibility of American representatives striking a deal with the new Bolshevik regime in 1918, and, second, the possibility of a mutual accord in 1945. While imperfect, the analogy between these moments is revealing. At each critical juncture the Communists in Russia desired US resources to rebuild their war-shattered country, and signaled a willingness to moderate their aims if such aid were forthcoming. While some key Americans favored pursuing possible deals, each potential accord ultimately fell prey to long-standing resentments.

In this context, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, especially in its earlier editions, is itself contained by the Cold War. Despite its revisionist stance, the book remained bounded by the assumptions prevailing in America during the conflict. Was conflict with Russia inevitable? LaFeber answers with a firm yes. The first sentence of the first edition reads: "It was October 1945 and war had never ended." The book goes on: "The new issue of Russia's leading doctrinal journal, *Bol'shevik*, warned that . . . the 'imperialist struggle,' which ignited World War II, continued to rage." Meanwhile, in Washington, "President Harry S. Truman delivered a speech larded with references to America's monopoly of atomic power." Even before the reader can turn to page two, the book concludes: "The triumphant wartime alliance had already split on ideological, economic, and political issues."[14]

Subsequent editions retained the same key conclusion: that the ideological incompatibility between Moscow's demand for a closed sphere of influence in Eastern Europe

and Washington's aspiration for an open door world made struggle between them, a cold war, unavoidable. The introduction to the tenth edition, reviewing US-Russian tensions since the late 19th century, concludes that the two nations "finally became partners because of a shotgun marriage forced upon them by World War II." Yet, as the opening line of the ensuing chapter makes plain: "A honeymoon never occurred."[15]

The message changed little over the course of forty years, nor did the implied weight of responsibility for the Cold War that ensued: The United States had given the Soviet Union $11 billion worth of materiel during the war and expected a return on its investment in the form of greater cooperation and an open door to Moscow's empire in Eastern Europe. Wary of repeated invasions from the West, the Soviets desired instead a buffer between themselves and the American-led capitalist world, and believed they had already paid their wartime debt in full. It cost 25 million Soviet lives to defeat the Nazis. American dead totaled only 420,000.

Although Roosevelt dominated US foreign policy during the war, LaFeber painted a broader canvas of American designs by focusing on the efforts of lower-level officials to set up an open world order friendly to American exports. He does not mention the 1943 Tehran summit at which Roosevelt and Stalin hammered out differences and outlined postwar settlements, for instance. Missing also is Roosevelt's alerting Averell Harriman (the American ambassador in Moscow) of his conclusion that postwar Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was inevitable no matter how deft his personal diplomacy, at least during a postwar transition. LaFeber thought otherwise, however, remaining skeptical that Rooseveltian magic could somehow bridge the chasm separating capitalists from communists.

Both sides may have feared the other too much for such accord. Quoting Louis Halle, the ranking member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, LaFeber told readers that "The

West lived under the terror of 'the muscovite tyranny that was spreading from the East." Literature painted the best picture in this instance. "For those who wished to understand such fears, Halle recommended reading J.R.R. Tolkien's trilogy, the Lord of the Rings, which Halle believed 'enshrines the mood and emotion of those long years.'"[16]

LaFeber's skepticism about the potential for deals with Russia is especially revealing when juxtaposed with the writings of his influencers, whose own work addressed the analogous question of a US-Russian accord in 1918. In *American-Russian Relations*, Williams details how close Raymond Robins, head of the American Red Cross' mission to Russia in World War I, came in 1918 to reaching an agreement with the leaders of Soviet Russia.[5] In the telling of Williams, economic imperatives remained crucial, but figured not as a barrier but as a potential bridge in terms of potential trade and safeguarded American investments in Russia. Though not a US government official, Robins enjoyed support from some close to Woodrow Wilson, and he quickly gained the confidence of Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin. "In his long talks with Lenin they worked out a comprehensive plan for fostering and expanding Soviet-American economic relations," Williams writes.[17] Such a deal envisioned trading financial support from Washington in exchange for the Bolsheviks' keeping Russia in the war against Germany, and thus implicitly keeping it within the international system as well. Details remained to be hammered out, but such a scenario might have altered the long-term course of US-Russian relations.

The question at hand is not whether the Robins-Lenin deal could have worked, but whether that game-changing prospect captured the imagination of those writing about it. Williams was clearly impressed by what Robins had tried to do. In 1949, he launched the research for his US-Russia book by spending two weeks with Robins, then living in Florida and confined to a wheelchair. Flattered by the attention, the elderly man entrusted his voluminous

papers to the graduate student. That infuriated Kennan, who soon thereafter launched his own book project on US-Russian relations during the Bolshevik Revolution. With limited access to the papers of Robins, Kennan accorded him only limited attention in his 1956 book.[18]

Harrington, however, singled out Robins for fulsome praise in his review of Kennan's book—written while LaFeber was his student in Madison—critiquing its author in the process. As Harrington saw it, "Robins is the central figure of this volume, but not the hero." The Wisconsin historian criticized Kennan for faulting Robins' amateur efforts, finding him too harsh in judging "this unofficial agent . . . wrong in judgment, tactics, and recollection of events," Harrington wrote, and wrong, most of all, "in believing it possible to work with Lenin and Trotsky." Granted, Harrington conceded, Robins overenthusiastically "engaged on a hopeless or near-hopeless mission. But was it wrong to try?"[19]

Robins appears neither in the pages of *America, Russia, and the Cold War* that discuss the Bolshevik Revolution nor in LaFeber's later textbook, *The American Age.* LaFeber had not totally forgotten, however. Where an account of Robins in 1918 does pop up, is at the end of LaFeber's career, his farewell lecture at the Beacon Theater in 2006. Here LaFeber devoted three sentences to detailing Robins' criticism of Woodrow Wilson but still failed to mention the aborted deal with Lenin that had so captured the imaginations of Harrington and Williams.

When first published in 1967, *America, Russia and the Cold War* quickly captured a chunk of the rapidly growing market for a fresh take on the Cold War. Reviews in *The American Historical Review* by Barton J. Bernstein and in *The Journal of American History* by George C. Herring, Jr. emphasized that this was a well-researched, pioneering "revisionist" account, indeed "a serious challenge to American historians" that packed "contemporary relevance and scholarly importance." Bernstein, himself a rising revisionist star, gently faulted LaFeber for not

recognizing how much Truman had repudiated Roosevelt's efforts to get along with Stalin. Moreover, while emphasizing the importance of America's quest for an open door world at the onset of the Cold War, LaFeber had, Bernstein argued, largely dropped this emphasis in subsequent chapters of the book.[20] This was a keen distinction that persisted through all ten editions. The emphasis on economic causation in the first part of the book did indeed fade in later chapters. A side note of possible significance is that when Bernstein's self-consciously "New Left" field-shaping book of "revisionist" essays, *Towards a New Past,* appeared in 1968, it included a chapter by Lloyd Gardner but not one by LaFeber. Perhaps his absence should not surprise.[21] LaFeber always resisted being pigeon-holed, even with friends and colleagues whose viewpoints he largely shared.

America, Russia, and the Cold War appealed to readers not only for its revisionist thesis and plethora of facts, but also for its readability. LaFeber emphasized the "direct and sharp" sentences he had learned to write from Harrington with the kind of pungent quotations and memorable metaphors that enabled Thomas A. Bailey, his M.A. adviser at Stanford, to write such popular textbooks.[22] LaFeber paid special attention to the lead sentence of each paragraph. With few distracting adjectives and adverbs, these sentences of mostly nouns and verbs got readers quickly to where the author wanted to bring them. To pick two random examples: "Dulles, nevertheless, was not content."[23] And, "the President went further."[24] Each sentence succinctly grabbed the reader's attention with the promise of further intrigue. Concluding sentences did the same. "Somehow, with the end of the Cold War, foreign policy was becoming more complex—and dangerous," was followed in turn by a blunt first sentence of its own: "Such dangers grew as the world shrank."[25]

LaFeber also infused his writing, like his lectures, with a sense that there was something important at stake, that this was a story that mattered. Employing irony and tragedy to lend dramatic flair, he also offered many a revealing quip. "And, as Henry Kissinger remarked about Russia," LaFeber wrote of the initial post-Cold War years, "'of course history does not always repeat itself. But expansion extending over four centuries does reflect a certain proclivity."[26] Studiously low-key was also his review of a later American leader: "Not even Rambo and Reagan's rhetoric could mask the failures of the President's original policies."[27]

LaFeber also praised, albeit often subtly. Having criticized President George H.W. Bush directly for his handling of the 1991 coup against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, he rehabilitated the president through comparison to one of his heroes. "The world was changing at a dizzying pace," he wrote of the late 1980s, though historian Henry Adams, who had written of his own dizzying era a century before, "would have felt at home." Why? Because "Adams was one of the few prominent Americans who, terrified by the possible catastrophes that could result from a disintegration of Russia, wanted to cooperate with the Russians and help them adjust peacefully to a new world. Most officials in the new George Bush administration agreed with Adams."[28]

LaFeber narrated with a pronounced certainty, especially in earlier editions of the book. Though intellectually committed to the revisionist project championed by Harrington and Williams, he forcefully got across the message that this was *the* story. The narrative might change in the future to reflect new questions and newly available sources, but for now, he was telling it like it was, according to the evidence and his own bedrock beliefs. Primary among these beliefs was that facts were facts. Particularly in the early years of his career, when he first conceptualized *America, Russia and the Cold War*, LaFeber reflected the high modernist

moment in American society. Amidst the turbulence of the post-World War II period and the tensions of the Cold War, verities endured. That was not as obvious a conclusion within the profession as one might think.

Carl L. Becker

LaFeber's firm belief in the fundamental difference between fact and fiction is reflected in a revealing challenge he posed to his hallowed predecessor at Cornell, Becker, another University of Wisconsin PhD and student of famed historian Frederick Jackson Turner. LaFeber revered Becker for resolutely "thinking otherwise," for his association with Beard and other Progressive historians, and for a devotion to Cornell that matched his own. That Harrington had worked with Becker at Cornell no doubt had heightened LaFeber's satisfaction in 1959 at snaring a plum position where Becker had strode the Arts Quad.

LaFeber underscored his connection to this predecessor in his copy of Becker's collection of essays, *Everyman His Own Historian*.[29] In this volume, as in most of his personal books, LaFeber penned his signature on the first page, typically with a single line scrawled under his name. His copy of Becker's essays, however, seemed to emphasize the owner's possession with four strokes of the pen. This was his book, and he probably wanted to think of himself as an inheritor of Becker's tradition.

All the more significant, then, that LaFeber differed so sharply with Becker's 1931 presidential address to the American Historical Association, "Everyman His Own Historian." As a Progressive historian, Becker expressed his deeply democratic sensibility about the wisdom of ordinary people. He also displayed a presciently post-modernist ethos that questioned the durability of "facts" and the supposed distinction between fact and fancy. "A myth," Becker

explained, “is a once valid but now discarded version of the human story, as our now valid versions will in due course be relegated to the category of discarded myths.” To which LaFeber queried on the margin “Myth is History?”[30] Reading through this famous essay, probably preparing a lecture for a Cornell audience, LaFeber signaled further linkage to Becker by inking an addition to the title. It now read, “Everyman His Own & Our Own Historian.”[31]

Affinity for Becker did not obviate LaFeber’s alarm. Progressing further into Becker’s essay, his question marks grew in size, and he pressed the fountain pen harder to the page. He scrawled the largest question mark to the right of a passage that he also underlined and set off with a vertical line. Sparking this concern was Becker’s assertion, “The facts do not speak: left to themselves they do not exist, not really, since for all practical purposes there is no fact until someone affirms it.”[32]

LaFeber’s longest penned comment responded to Becker’s eerily prescient post-modern populism. LaFeber underscored the words of Becker printed here in italics. “Berate him as we will for not reading our books, Mr. Everyman is stronger than we are, and sooner or later we must *adapt* our knowledge to his *necessities*. Otherwise he will leave us to . . . cultivate a species of dry professional arrogance growing out of the thin soil of antiquarian research.” In Becker’s view the stories Americans tell about themselves must prove useful, regardless of where the facts might lead, or they would be discarded by the bulk of the population not just as myths, but as lies.

LaFeber would have none of this. He squeezed into the book’s margin a concern that speaks to the challenges faced by scholars in the third decade of the twentieth-first century: “This is close to saying that history must be written according to the Will of the Majority or the strongest interest groups. If the latter, Becker’s Liberalism is open to question. If the former or

latter, his History is so opened." Four additional strokes of the fountain pen underscored his critique.[33]

LaFeber later explained how Becker's "relativism" rendered him unable to "come to terms with the significance of either Hitler or the isolationist US foreign policy of the 1930s." He quoted Becker's insistence in the late 1930s that "'abolishing oppression by suppressing oppressors'" would not work. "At a turning point in history," LaFeber noted sadly, "Becker did not turn." The alternative to such paralysis, LaFeber continued, was Reinhold Niebuhr, who understood that "absolute evil could exist and could only be destroyed by counterforce."[34] Niebuhr also emphasized, with particular appeal for LaFeber, that even the destruction of evil demanded limits.

Reinhold Niebuhr

Aside from Harrington and Williams, no one matched Niebuhr's influence on LaFeber's thinking, through numerous works but especially his *The Irony of American History*.[35] Finding the concept of irony both personally and intellectually appealing, LaFeber frequently assigned the text to his students and used it in scaffolding *America, Russia and the Cold War*. Niebuhr explained that while pathos amounts to bad fortune that just happens, and tragedy entails a conscious choice of evil for the sake of good, irony "consists of apparently fortuitous incongruities," which turn out to be not so fortuitous, but rather result from pressing assumed virtue too far. For instance, the unsurpassed power of the United States could lead to excessive confidence, then engagement in unwinnable conflicts, and ultimately weakness produced by an initial sense of strength. The quest for absolute security could impel risk-taking, such as preventive war, and thus similarly undermine safety. The incongruity of strength engendering

weakness is akin to comedy, Niebuhr notes, and indeed "the element of comedy is never completely eliminated from irony."[36]

All this made sense to LaFeber, who infused his writings and lectures with Niebuhr's teachings. The historian saw the theologian as a twentieth century revisiting of two of his favorite thinkers from the eighteenth century, Jonathan Edwards and James Madison. He also appreciated Niebuhr's emphasis on the dangers of overweening power and the consequent importance of countervailing forces. This is what James Madison had laid out in Federalist No. 10. Sensitive to the importance of balance, Niebuhr, like Madison, stressed both the need for political limitations on the marketplace and the limits of such regulation. Appraising the index of Richard Wightman Fox's biography of Niebuhr, LaFeber penned: "No Madison."[37] It was not a compliment.

With commentary penned in the margins and with torn up slips of Cornell stationery to mark pages, LaFeber's annotated copies of the Fox book and of *The Irony of American History* revealed much of his own philosophy. He coded his degrees of enthusiasm. Two vertical lines and an asterisk in the margin celebrated a critique of blind militarism: "The realists are inclined to argue that a good cause will hallow any weapon. They are convinced that the evils of communism are so great that we are justified in using any weapons against them. Thereby they approach the communist ruthlessness."[38] LaFeber seconded Niebuhr's endorsement of Kennan's warning of "the evils which arise from the pursuit of unlimited rather than limited ends."[39] A slip of paper, double lines, and an asterisk signaled accord with "Man is an ironic creature because he forgets that he is not simply a creator but also a creature."[40]

LaFeber applauded Niebuhr for never having "doubted that political authority should exercise dominance over the economic sphere in the interests of justice."[41] The imperative of

restraining the marketplace remained an article of faith for LaFeber, while the notion that economic power itself could be both liberating and limiting can be seen in his ongoing reassessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the US and Soviet economies. In later editions of *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, he emphasized, for example, what historian Paul Kennedy dubbed "imperial overstretch."[42] Both the United States and the Soviet Union suffered a growing inability to solve their own internal and external problems, brought on in part by the cost of expansion, empire, and hubris. By 1991, the Soviet Union had succumbed to the malady. Though ostensibly triumphant, the United States, LaFeber asserted, faced more than ever the same challenges that Madison had signaled at the nation's birth.

Faith in Madison's continuing importance sparked LaFeber's longest marginal comment in Fox's biography of Niebuhr. Responding to the theologian's observation that both America and Russia exhibited expansionist tendencies, LaFeber reflected that "Globalization is the later playing out of Federalist 10 & expanding the sphere – only without a central Govt Madison deemed essential – or using the market as a farcical substitute."[43] By the 2006 edition, appearing fifteen years after the Soviet Union had unexpectedly imploded, LaFeber employed Madison to make a new point, one almost unfathomable in the late 1960s when the Cold War appeared a permanent fixture of contemporary international affairs: that the story could be told as one of winners and losers. "I cannot but think…that the future growth of Russia…[is] not a little overrated," LaFeber quotes Madison as reflecting in 1821."[44]

While surprised (like most analysts) by the sudden demise of the Soviet Union and the rapidity of the Cold War's end in Europe, LaFeber, like Niebuhr and Kennan, had long nurtured a skepticism about human nature that rendered him leery of social engineering, whether by communists, capitalists, or Christians. LaFeber pulled out all the stops – two lines, four asterisks,

and a shred of Cornell stationery – to applaud Niebuhr's dismissing "with utter derision the deepest hope that animated thousands of radical and liberal Christians . . . . the inauguration of a community of love."[45] Not effervescent love but hard-earned justice appealed to LaFeber as well as to Niebuhr.

That value was reflected in LaFeber's reaction to the deepest crisis at Cornell during his nearly half-century there: the armed occupation of Willard Straight Hall in April 1969. As recounted in the first chapter in this volume, he opposed the armed occupation once violence threatened, and when governance of Cornell seemed up for grabs, looked askance at those pushing for a "community of love" on the Arts Quad and in the mass meeting in Barton Hall. Upon hearing that an emerging unicameral senate composed of students, faculty, and administrators was, like the anti-Beardian intellectuals of the early 1960s, talking "consensus," LaFeber acidly remarked that they would likely "soon arrive at their own Vietnam."[46] In this instance as in others, some who adored LaFeber imputed in him a radicalism that was simply not there. Endorsing Niebuhr's disapproval of his rival, Paul Tillich, for his focus on the senses, emotions, and individual pursuit of the good life, LaFeber caustically penned "the 1960s."[47]

As LaFeber' stance in 1969 illustrated, when it came to governance, whether of the university or of the nation, he preferred cool reason to emotion or force. And yet throughout his life he also loved the exaggerated drama of operas and the ginned-up emotionalism of baseball rivalries. His famous lectures sustained attention because they engaged both the mind and the feelings of listeners. It came naturally to LaFeber to balance reason and emotion with grace.

Detailing the impact of Niebuhr on LaFeber is important not only in terms of understanding the latter but also in explaining why the theologian occupied so much scarce real estate in *America, Russia*, *and the Cold War*. In the preface to the first edition, LaFeber

emphasized the difficulty of fitting his analysis of 1945-66 into the page limit allowed by the publisher. Time only tightened the squeeze for later editions. The first's 259 pages allotted twelve pages per year. By the tenth edition, the book had grown to 450 pages, yet had to cover sixty-one years, permitting only seven pages per year. Later editions packed more words onto each page, and even the paper grew thinner. Yet even with space at such a premium, LaFeber retained the sections on Niebuhr. Indeed, they grew, and the repeated summoning of Niebuhr in the conclusions of all the editions of the volume testify to this deepest of influences.

Niebuhr also helps explain the book's appeal to readers. What LaFeber launched in 1967 as a study of US-Russian relations in their larger context expanded into a textbook on US relations with the rest of the world. LaFeber managed to include numerous important global developments while maintaining his readable narrative. The bumper-sticker story line of *America, Russia, and the Cold War* comes straight out of Niebuhr: Emerging from World War II as the most powerful nation in history, the United States spent decades dissipating its power in unwise foreign adventures while neglecting mounting problems at home.

"Not since Jonathan Edwards' day of the 1740s, had an American theologian so affected his society," wrote LaFeber about the onset of the Cold War. Like Edwards, "Niebuhr emphasized the role of sin and sinful power in that society." Humans' birthright of sin burdened them with avarice, selfishness, and an inability to realize the limits of their own power. These weaknesses led to anxieties and an inability to use freedom constructively. Such emotional reactions engendered a will-to-power and, inevitably, conflict. Given these dangerous aspects of human nature, reason and even science were easily corrupted and blind to their limits. Underscoring the importance of a liberal arts education, LaFeber, echoing Niebuhr, warned that

science "often refused to use the religious and historical insights required to solve secular problems."[48]

All this, Niebuhr argued, made communism especially dangerous. That ideology's true believers failed to perceive that while mankind enjoyed only a limited capacity for good, it suffered an almost limitless inclination to perpetrate evil in the name of good. Hence the United States had to contain Soviet Russia, as Kennan had urged in 1946-47. Niebuhr, LaFeber explained, "provided a historical basis and rationale for the tone, the outlook, the unsaid, and often unconscious assumptions of this period."[49] In laying out Niebuhr's foreign policy recommendations in 1946-47 – Cold War policies that included opposing the Soviet Union, rebuilding Germany and Western Europe, and integrating an economic, political, and military Atlantic community led by Washington – LaFeber's language signaled little space between the theologian's ideas and his own. Left unquestioned by either Niebuhr or LaFeber was whether a lasting breach with the Soviet Union was the necessary and safest course.

In his discussion of the domestically divisive Korean War, LaFeber cited Niebuhr's warning that only a half-decade into the Cold War, Americans were already losing their sense of limits. They were also trusting too much in economic growth and scientific advances to solve basic moral and political problems. LaFeber approvingly cited Niebuhr's quoting John Adams: "'Power always thinks it has a great soul and vast views beyond the comprehension of the weak; and that it is doing God's service when it is violating all his Laws.'"[50] LaFeber also drew on Niebuhr's criticism of America's disastrous use of overweening force in the Vietnam War.

The dilemmas of hubris and power infused the final editions of *America, Russia, and the Cold War* with a sense of uncertainty largely absent in earlier versions. The world was moving fast and changing radically. The United States had prevailed in the cold war—or more

accurately, its principal adversary had collapsed. Yet it remained unclear how the United States should deploy its enormous power to better either the nation or the world. Pursuit of the Open Door throughout the 20th century contributed to conflict. Such was the case, again, after 1991. To be fair, LaFeber's caution when composing the most recent editions may reflect the heightened prudence of a mature historian faced with a paucity of archival records. Still, the final editions of *America, Russia, and the Cold War* offer almost as many questions as answers, inserting hints of ambivalence even in moments of apparent American triumph. George H.W. "Bush's inability to take advantage of the Soviet opportunities" as the Cold War waned "was not because of America's public opinion," he wrote of the transition period between Gorbachev's inadvertent dissolution of the Soviet Union and Boris Yeltsin's bold creation of its Russian successor.[51]

"Perhaps the President's great caution was caused by the inability of himself and his top advisers," he wrote more than a decade after the events he described, "all of whom had grown up in the Cold War, to imagine a world without the Soviets or a Cold War." The tone differed sharply from the bold assertiveness of earlier editions. "Perhaps it was because Bush, Cheney, Baker, and Scowcroft had all been involved with Gerald Ford in 1976 when détente turned sour and Ford went down to defeat in the presidential election," he surmised. "Perhaps it was due to the administration's fear that if Yeltsin won, the Soviet Union could become so chaotic as to present new dangers."[52]

Perhaps indeed. The word signifies caution, antidote to the hubris that both Niebuhr and LaFeber feared. As the final editions of the book detailed, Presidents H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and G. W. Bush each tried to impose order on Russian-American relations after the Soviet Union's collapse. In part because of external factors, but also in part due to their own over-

appreciation of their own power, none developed a lasting solution. Clinton, for instance, ranked as "the first US President in more than a half-century to serve his entire tenure in a world without the Cold War," LaFeber wrote. Yet "even without a Cold War, Clinton raised his military budgets from $260 billion to over $300 billion. Meanwhile, he and Bush sent US troops into more conflicts during the 1990-2000 era than had been sent during any other post-1950 decade."[53] Both presidents proved willing to deploy force, yet neither produced a defining vision for American foreign policy, with bold initiatives such as the Marshall Plan and NATO, that strategists in Truman's age had so effectively developed.

By the mid-1990s, LaFeber was gaining a new appreciation for that early Cold War period, especially in comparison with what he saw as the overreach and sloppiness of Clinton's foreign policy. Privately, he appraised National Security Adviser Tony Lake as "more screwed up than even I thought or imagined," and resolved, half-seriously, to get "away from all this and back to the good old days when Men were Men, Women were Women, and Presidents were Harry Truman." He was, literally, returning to the Truman Library to look anew at material on the Truman Doctrine, "which I think raises fundamental questions about whether the United States can ever create a foreign policy if the public has its way."[54] LaFeber seemed understandably uncertain what was worse, democratic paralysis or imperial overreach.

Unable to tap extensive archival sources for more recent years, LaFeber proved adept at logging into the digital age, while information also flowed in from an impressive network of contacts. After decades of teaching courses packed with Cornell students already fascinated by world affairs, or sucked in by the force of his teaching, LaFeber operated at the nexus of his own web of experts at the top ranks of academia, business, finance, law, and, not least, government. In January 2003 during the leadup to the US invasion of Iraq, for example, LaFeber

corresponded with Daniel Fried, a career diplomat then on the staff of the National Security Council. He concluded from this conversation that "oil is of course front and center in the whole thing, although one would never know it from the *NY Times*, *Washington Post*, or the Bush administration."[55]

More than memories of Bailey Hall lectures sustained such valued relationships. A dedicated correspondent, LaFeber wrote long, single-spaced letters and, later, emails to a wide variety of acquaintances and friends. Former undergraduate David Maisel '68 regularly sent brief notices of this or that story in a newspaper or magazine. LaFeber composed detailed replies. Here was the dedicated professor giving substance to the often-hollow chestnut that teaching complemented scholarship.

LaFeber's success in inspiring students to rise to the highest levels of the US Government fostered its own dilemmas. In the years immediately preceding the publication of the tenth edition in 2008, LaFeber could boast (had he been so inclined) of a dazzling array of former students making or carrying out US foreign policy. These stars included not only career diplomats like Fried but also national security advisers, vice presidential aides, and ambassadors. LaFeber took pride in their accomplishments, yet like any citizen or mentor, invariably expressed skepticism and even alarm whenever he thought their policies contravened lessons he'd tried to impart in class.

True to form, he did so quietly. In March 1999, for example, with Bill Clinton's air war against the Serbs in Kosovo seemingly open-ended, LaFeber worried that "the Clinton rhetoric . . . almost exactly repeats that of LBJ and Nixon in Vietnam – 'stay the course,' the domino theory underlying it all." He worried that "some people," including Clinton's NSC adviser Sandy Berger (Class of 1967), "did not pay adequate attention in their History classes in the 1960s."[56]

Skepticism over his former student's role in forging national policy, however, soon morphed into pride. By the time of the 2002 edition of *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, Kosovars were free from Serbian domination, and LaFeber in turn praised Berger for having spurred Clinton's pledge not to deploy ground troops to bolster the air war.[57] Ever cautious about the use of force in foreign relations, LaFeber was relieved that his student had, after all, imbibed the virtue of restraint. "Stories circulated that Clinton, who had an explosive temper, had privately berated Berger for his advice," LaFeber wrote. "The President should have thanked him."[58]

Clinton's international problems paled in comparison to the world his successor confronted after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. George W. Bush launched a global war on terror in response, which ultimately included an invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, something policymakers a decade before had assiduously avoided during their own conflict in the volatile Persian Gulf. This new generation of leaders believed their nation's exceptional power could overcome historic ethnic and religious divisions within the conquered country, and furthermore believed it possible in the Cold War's wake to export American-style democracy at gunpoint. LaFeber wasn't surprised. Niebuhr had warned of the hubris that stems from power, especially when multiplied by fear and uncertainty. "As world affairs became less predictable after 1989-1991," LaFeber concluded, "Americans continued to rely on their military superiority to deal with much of the unpredictability."[59]

Washington's post-9/11 policies eventually buckled under their own contradictions, dissipating American power and international prestige in the process, leaving LaFeber distressed, albeit largely in private. After President Bush on March 19, 2003 announced the forceful overthrow of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, veteran newsman Jim Lehrer invited LaFeber to discuss the war on PBS Newshour, yet he refused this and other such requests. "I do not want publicly to

say how I really feel about current policy," he confided to a friend on March 23, but "the more I see of what is going on the angrier I'm becoming. Something has gone really wrong."[60] His 10th and final edition of America, Russia, and the Cold War carried the story through 2006, albeit with a tie back to a seminal moment in American internationalism. Woodrow "Wilson had failed to 'make the world safe for democracy' (as he famously phrased it)" and "had died broken an embittered." Bush was no less a Wilsonian, equally convinced principles could repair a broken world while building a better one in its place. Bush too "emphasized an American mission to create new democracies" as well, LaFeber ultimately concluded, and in doing so "appeared to be a reincarnation of the Woodrow Wilson from nearly a century earlier."[61]

Although LaFeber never grew nostalgic for the Cold War, he ultimately came to appreciate aspects of its certainty. He mused that "it well might be the only way the US can exercise its power in complicated global situations is by telling Americans they have to join a 'crusade,' as Harry Truman did in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. … Otherwise, Americans are great, as someone recently noted, at both globalizing business and navel-gazing at the same time."[62] The irony was that crusades easily mutated into disasters, especially if US leaders tried to spread democracy in countries ill-prepared for it, such as Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. In the final edition of *America, Russia, and the Cold War,* LaFeber added a long chapter to explain "The World Turned Upside Down 2001-2006." His tone was coolly analytical as he laid out all the mistakes made by US leaders after 9/11. Privately, however, he flashed anger. In Iraq, Bush and Rice "don't have a clue as to what is happening," while "Czar Vlad I in Russia [is] systematically eliminating all opposition while we continue to support him." Meanwhile, "the Democrats carry out their plans to execute Bush by firing while standing in their own circle. What a bunch of losers."[63] Foolishness, like tyranny, "is rooted in a human

nature that cannot be changed, only contained," LaFeber believed.[64] Hence the importance of Niebuhr's emphasis on limiting both concentrated power and confidence in such might.

Such limits were missing in the curriculum at some key universities, LaFeber remarked in a mostly serious tone. "There really is an arrogance that Yale instills that condemns its students to intellectual unreality -- even much more so than Harvard – and as I've told Harvard students in my office, Harvard's most important gifts to the world have been the Vietnam War and the Unibomber. Yale's are the Iraqi/Afghanistan catastrophes and John Kerry."[65]

An emphasis on the importance of limits infused both LaFeber's decades of teaching at Cornell and his dedication to updating *America, Russia, and the Cold War.* The single most telling fact about LaFeber's forty-year odyssey with that book is that he concluded every edition the same way: with Niebuhr. Moreover, from the second edition to the last, he couched the warning against overweening power and unceasing conflict in terms of a somewhat obscure formulation that evidently appealed to him. Niebuhr had unearthed from *Romans 7* the passage, "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and making me captive to the law of sin being in my members." Both Niebuhr and LaFeber interpreted this dichotomy in terms of the Cold War. They viewed the "sin" of the "law in my members," that is, the weakness and inclination toward evil of the body, as referring to the militarized rivalry that characterized the Cold War, as well as the hard line, "realist" policies of Washington and Moscow in waging the struggle. In this polarity, the law of the mind and of God figured as negotiation and compromise.

Although a cold war between America and Russia was flaring up again in the early 2000s, LaFeber in the last paragraph of the final edition of *America, Russia, and the Cold War* sought to inject restraint into that rivalry by enlisting the last leader of the Soviet Union as a

Niebuhrian. He quoted Mikhail Gorbachev, who in 1992 had spoken at the same forum where Winston Churchill had made his Iron Curtain speech, as counseling Americans not to take a "'monocentric'" view and try to dominate the post-Cold War world. Gorbachev sounded, LaFeber affirmed, "much like Niebuhr." He then invoked "the spirit of James Madison warning about the dangers of fragmenting empires." Finally, cruising to the end of this four-decade journey, LaFeber cautioned that growing disorder could lead people around the world to "resort to what Niebuhr called 'the law in our members.'"[66] Little that has happened since, either in America or in Russia, suggests that anyone has learned this lesson.

Endnotes

[1] George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), vii. LaFeber most likely made this comment in 1963 or 1964, following publication of his first monograph, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963).

[2] Sandra LaFeber email to Frank Costigliola, August 1, 2022.

[3] Becker's own view on the question of academic engagement with society and contemporary affairs, discussed below, mutated during World War I. Critical of Becker's lackluster opposition to the growing Nazi threat in the 1930s, LaFeber nonetheless found classroom inspiration in the ideal of thinking "otherwise." It was, he argued, the ideal way to learn. "One of the things that should happen here [Cornell] is that you're opened up to other perspectives, and you should be challenged," he told students in 2010. "It doesn't mean you change. What it should be is that if you are right, your reasoning should be reinforced… That's one of the purposes of Cornell, to throw out these kinds of challenges to people, take positions and argue about them." Jenny Proctor, "One Role of a Professor is to Think "Otherwise," says LaFeber," *Cornell Chronicle*, October 18, 2010.

[4] Walter LaFeber, "Fred Harvey Harrington, Teacher and Friend," in *Behind the Throne Servants of Power to Imperial President, 1898-1968*, ed. Thomas J. McCormick and Walter LaFeber (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 3.

[5] LaFeber, "Harrington," 3.

[6] LaFeber, "Harrington," 16.

[7] Lloyd C. Gardner to Frank Costigliola email, August 11, 2022.

[8] See for example, Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), 92; LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 101. Hereafter the date of each book's subtitle will distinguish the edition.

[9] "Timeline – 1950 – "Wisconsin School" #2, A History of the University of Wisconsin Department of History, https://history.wisc.edu/department-information/the-history-of-the-history-department/timeline-1950-wisconsin-school-2/

[10] Sandra LaFeber email to Frank Costigliola, August 1, 2022.

[11] LaFeber, "Harrington," 17.

[12] LaFeber's copy of Williams, *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. Thanks to Doug Little for sharing his observation.

[13] Gardner to Costigliola email, August 11, 2022.

[14] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966*, 1.

[15] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 7.

[16] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 13 fn7.

[17] William Appleman Williams, *American Russian Relations 1781-1947* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1952), 142.

[18] George F. Kennan, *Russia Leaves the War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 64, fn44.

[19] Fred Harvey Harrington, review of Kennan, *Russia Leaves the War*, *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 44 (June 1957): 165-66. Kennan also believed that there had been a chance for Robins to strike a deal – that is, if Robins had possessed the knowledge of Russian language and history, the diplomatic expertise, and the familiarity with Marxist ideology that Kennan himself commanded. See Costigliola, foreword to Kennan, *Russia Leaves the War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023), xxi.

[20] George C. Herring, Jr. review in *The Journal of American History* 56 (June 1969): 184-65; Barton J. Bernstein, review in *The American Historical Review* 74 (October 1968): 113-14.

[21] Barton J. Bernstein, *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History* (NY: Pantheon, 1968).

[22] LaFeber, "Harrington," 8.

[23] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966*, 157.

[24] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 257.

[25] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 373.

[26] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 384.

[27] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 330.

[28] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 346.

[29] *Everyman His Own Historian: Essays on History and Politics*, ed. Carl L. Becker (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc, 1935.

[30] Becker, *Everyman*, 247.

[31] Becker, *Everyman*, 233.

[32] Becker, *Everyman*, 251.

[33] Becker, *Everyman* 252.

[34] LaFeber, "Carl Becker's Histories and the American Present," *Ezra* 4 (Fall 2011), 7, 9.

[35] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952).

[36] Niebuhr, *Irony of American History*, vii-viii.

[37] Richard Wightman Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr A Biography* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985).

[38] Niebuhr, *Irony of American History*, 40.

[39] Niebuhr, *Irony of American History*, 149.

[40] Niebuhr, *Irony of American History*, 156.

[41] Fox, *Niebuhr*, 286.

[42] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).

[43] Fox, *Niebuhr*, 245.

[44] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 349.

[45] Fox, *Niebuhr*, 140.

[46] LaFeber conversation with Frank Costigliola in Olin Library, late April 1969.

[47] Fox, *Niebuhr*, 258.

[48] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-66*, 40; LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, 1945-2006*, 52.*

[49] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cole War, 1945-1966*, 40-41.

[50] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-66*, 132-33; LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 140-41.

[51] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002*, 357.

[52] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 361.

[53] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 387.

[54] LaFeber to David Maisel, August 22, 1995, David Maisel papers, in private possession.

[55] LaFeber to Maisel, January 15, 2003, Maisel papers.

[56] LaFeber to Maisel, March 23, 2003, Maisel papers.

[57] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 385; LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 387.

[58] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 387.

[59] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1992*, 354.

[60] LaFeber to Maisel, March 23, 2003, Maisel papers.

[61] LaFeber, America, *Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 429.

[62] LaFeber to Maisel, June 28, 1997, Maisel papers.

[63] LaFeber to Maisel, January 4, 2004, Maisel papers.

[64] *Cornell Alumni Magazine*, May/June 2006, p. 41.

[65] LaFeber email to David Maisel, January 7, 2008, Maisel papers.

[66] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 450.