schools. The history of the campaigns we are about to record, as well  as the whole Texas Revolution, furnish abundant proof that, as an aggregate, more efficient soldiers were never in uniform.9 European and American warfare - warfare in an open country with walled towns, and in American forests and swamps - should be as essentially different as if they were distinct trades. The Texas people are perfect in the latter, while they would be eminently efficient in the former, because they are the best marksmen in the world, and it is a cardinal point with them never to fire without covering the object fired at. The books teach us the different modes of carrying a fortification; here tactics is most needed, while in American warfare circumstances so often occur which no book-rule can cover. The draught, then, is upon the intellect, and he who can draw most heavily upon this source is most efficient. It is alone the natural intellect which teaches strategy, if we may be allowed the word. In Europe war should be the science of tactics, while in America, in contradistinction, it should be the art of strategy. Let us return to the Medina camp.
Thus, towards the close of this week of breeches-making and plenty, both the general and the artillery arrived, and orders were issued for immediate march. 
General Somerville, however, was too skilled in the art of strategy to let such a favourable opportunity escape him of surprising Laredo. So, after sending back the artillery which he had taken some two weeks to bring up, he suddenly makes a "left oblique" for the Laredo road, with an intention of surprising that defenceless town in six or seven days.1 The third and fourth days of this surprising march found the general in a most surprising post-oak bog about thirty miles distant. All persons who have once been in a post-oak region after a heavy rain, would again avoid so doing as a pestilence.