Brad Thompson

Much of my research concerns the relationship between the two central features of mentality--consciousness and intentionality. I'm particularly interested in the idea that conscious experiences have a certain kind of intentional content in virtue of their phenomenal character. Much of my work is devoted to defending a Fregean rather than a Russellian theory of this "phenomenal content". I am also particularly interested in related issues concerning the relationship between appearance and reality. Are the phenomenal properties that are present to us in veridical perceptual experience mind-independent properties of external objects, or are they mental or mind-dependent properties?

Representative Publications

"The Spatial Content of Experience," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
"Senses for Senses," Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).
"The Inverted Spectrum," forthcoming in Oxford Companion to Consciousness, edited by Cleeremans et al.
"Representationalism and the Argument from Hallucination," (2008) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89: 384-412.
"Representationalism and the Conceivability of Inverted Spectra," (2008) Synthese 160: 203-213.
"Shoemaker on Phenomenal Content," (2007) Philosophical Studies 135: 307-334.
"Colour Constancy and Russellian Representationalism," (2006) Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84: 75-94.
"Moral Value, Response-Dependence, and Rigid Designation," (2006) Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36: 71-94.

Work in Progress

"Seeing Through Appearances".
"Perceptual Demonstratives and Hallucination".

Teaching

PHIL 1318: Contemporary Moral Problems
PHIL 1318H: Contemporary Moral Problems (Honors)
PHIL 3310: Advanced Topics in Philosophy (Consciousness)
PHIL 3310: Advanced Topics in Philosophy (Perception)
PHIL 3315: Philosophy of Mind