This article critiques the common law assumption that the disclosure obligation in patent law serves a "teaching" function and proposes that, instead, the disclosure obligation should be viewed as a means of showing possession. The article begins with an overview of the disclosure obligation in patent law, with primary focus on the enablement requirement. Next, the article describes how the currently accepted view of the enablement requirement runs contrary to theoretical justifications for the patent system, including the incentive theory, prospect theory, patent signaling, and portfolio theory. The article then proposes that enablement is the best mechanism by which to show possession and that such a view of enablement is more consistent with the theoretical justifications for the patent system. Lastly, the article reviews the current uses of enablement and describes other areas of patent law where adoption of the idea that enablement demonstrates the possession of an invention would simplify the law and add greater certainty.

This article focuses on the methods by which new development costs are funded. The costs of modern suburban growth are increasingly borne by private developers through a practice known as an exaction. Private developers are required to make both on and off-site improvements, dedicate land, and pay cash to local governments. Part I of the article focuses on general municipal finance. Part II looks at the evolution of exactions in American land use policy. Part III analyzes the characteristics, policy rationale, and development implications of development impact fees. Part IV examines the oversight of local government impact fees by both state and federal courts. The author concludes that impact fee policy is influenced more by state action, whether legislative or judiciary, than the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, the legal and political culture has evolved, leading state courts to accept these impact fees as an expression of the social attitude to a fundamental question of public responsibility.

This is the last article in a seven part series on the delegation of prosecutorial power to private parties. The focus of this article is (1) to look at the nature of white collar prosecutions, such as the trend of using punitive civil actions instead of criminal prosecution, (2) to examine the emerging role of private individuals as prosecutors of white collar crime, (3) to briefly review the jurisprudence about the law’s expressive function, and (4) to look at the how the law’s expressive function can be helped or harmed, based on the “quality” of the private individual that is being granted prosecutorial discretion. In an area such as economic misconduct and white collar crime, that is not generally viewed as evil, this expressive function is especially important, because “quality” individuals that become “private attorney generals” can create a broader societal recognition that economic misconduct is wrong, which in turn helps in obtaining more “quality” individuals to serve as “private attorney generals”.

This article analyzes the efforts by the United States government and private American institutions to convey the message to these newly freed nations of the need to adhere to the rule of law and respect for property rights as a necessary condition for economic development and human freedom. It will also examine how the United States has veered away from adherence to these rules of law and respect for private property rights that it espouses abroad.

In this casenote, the author criticizes the Fifth Circuit decision in White Buffalo, LLC v. University of Texas at Austin that the CAN-SPAM Act can be preempted by the university's anti-solicitation policy. The case note discusses each factor of the Central Hudson First Amendment analysis, and determines they have been misapplied in this case. Due to the pre-emption language in the statute and the policies behind the Act, such a decision should have resulted in no preemption by the school and thus creates a violation of the freedom of speech under the First Amendment.

S. Brannon Latimer explores the law relating to habeas review and outside influences on the jury, and criticizes a recent Ninth Circuit application of such law in Musladin v. Lamarque. In Musladin, the court relied on appellate court precedent to find an unacceptable risk of impermissible influence on the jury where family members, during trial, wore buttons depicting a picture of the victim. Latimer argues that the holding in Musladin is flawed because the Ninth Circuit relied on appellate court precedent in violation of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The Ninth Circuit should have, Latimer explains, looked only to relevant Supreme Court precedent embodied in the Estelle v. Williams and Holbrook v. Flynn cases. Proper application of those cases suggests that the Ninth Circuit should have upheld the district court’s denial of the habeas petition.

This article focuses on the Third Circuit’s decision in DiGiacomo v. Teamsters Pension Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity, an ERISA case dealing with vested and accrued benefits. The author begins by explaining the facts and the holding of DiGiacomo. The article then shifts the focus to the two alternative methods in which the accrual and vesting of benefits sections of ERISA can be interpreted. The article concludes with the author giving his reasoning for choosing one method over the other, and explains why the court should have done the same.

This casenote addresses the First Circuit’s recent change to the Subject Matter Jurisdiction test for a claim against a foreign defendant under the Lanham Act. The original test considered whether the defendant's conduct had some effect on United States commerce, whether the defendant is a United States citizen, and whether a conflict exists within trademark rights established under foreign law. The First Circuit held the courts should only consider whether the defendant's conduct had a substantial effect on United States commerce. The author objects to the First Circuit's change because it eliminates comity from the test which it creates inconsistency in federal case law.