The Class Action Fairness Act was passed in early 2005, for the purpose of broadening the jurisdiction of federal courts with respect to nationwide class actions. The Act was a response to the perceived problems and abuses of the state courts in their capacity as the primary forum for nationwide class actions. This article argues that the Act overlooked a fundamental issue: Whether any court, state or federal, may properly assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant when only a small portion of the class claims arise from the defendant’s forum state activities. The article begins by giving a background of the nationwide class action phenomenon, as well as the debate over whether state courts are the proper venues to hear such claims. The author then turns to the issues that arise regarding personal jurisdiction in state courts, not the least of which is a possible due process violation. The article next turns to federal personal jurisdiction issues, specifically discussing how long-arm statutes may not be broad enough to properly allow jurisdiction in some instances. Finally, the author concludes by suggesting certain changes that can be made in order for the Act to carry out its desired effect.

"No Harm, No Foul: Calculation of Nondischarggable Damages In Transactions Tainted by Fraud" examines section 523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code which allows creditors to specify certain debts honestly obtained but later tainted by fraud nondischargable in a bankruptcy proceeding. Such section does not contain a requirement that the creditor be damaged by fraud, but only places a limitation on the causation of the loss. Without this requirement, the author attempts to determine the optimum balance of helping a debtor in bankruptcy by allowing for the discharge of many of their debts and the protection of creditors harmed by the fraudulent activities of the debtor. By suggesting that courts include a requirement that the creditor show the actual amount of damages caused by the fraudulent statements, the author hopes to both prevent a windfall to the bank resulting from an entire debt being declared nondischargable and to discourage fraud by requiring some obligations incurred by the debtor to be repaid after bankruptcy.

The Supreme Court decided F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. in a narrow opinion that failed to address a split among the circuits. The Court left that issue, regarding how to apply the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act to unlawful conduct with domestic anticompetitive effects that bring about foreign injury, for the D.C. Circuit to handle on remand. This article examines three related questions left open by the Supreme Court: (1) how did the Empagran decision effect the reach of the Sherman Act; (2) what is its likely impact on existing and future antitrust claims in American courts by foreign plaintiffs based on transactions abroad; and (3) do foreign plaintiffs injured abroad have standing to suin in American courts under American law.

This article provides a comparison of how three bodies of credit law, U.C.C. Article 5, the 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP 500), and the 1998 International Standby Practices (ISP 98), facilitate applicant ad hoc waiver of known discrepancies found in documents presented by the beneficiary under a letter of credit in order to expedite a transaction between the applicant and beneficiary. The article begins with an overview of letter of credit law and then proceeds to distinguish an applicant ad hoc waiver of known documentary discrepancies from an amendment of a letter of credit agreed upon by the applicant and beneficiary, from preclusion of applicant objection to honor, and from preclusion of presenter objection to dishonor. Next, the article contrasts how the three bodies of law apply letter of credit rules to assure prompt and certain payment to the beneficiary in a letter of credit transaction. The thrust of the article then follows, focusing on how the three bodies of law, in conjunction with case law, govern 1) applicant contact and separate treatment of subsequent presentations from prior ones, 2) what constitutes a reasonable time for honor or dishonor, and 3) the issuer's independent rights and obligations with respect to the applicant's waiver. Lastly, the article discusses how UCP 500 and ISP 98 can supercede conflicting U.C.C. Article 5 provisions that are variable.

This comment discusses the relatively new issue of spyware and the ways in which state and federal governments are attempting to combat the problems associated with spyware. First, the comment provides an overview of the various definitions created for the term “spyware,” a discussion of the four forms of spyware, and a description of programs that, while resembling spyware, should not be subject to legislation. Second, the comment provides a description of the types of provisions that are typically found in spyware legislation, including “definition”, “exclusion”, and “enforcement” provisions. Third, the comment critiques state and federal legislation developed to address concerns related to spyware by analyzing the variances in the legislation’s scope and effectiveness. Finally, the comment recommends improving the effectiveness of current legislation and attacking the spyware problem through other means such as technology, self regulation, and user education.

This student comment discusses the difficulty in proving discriminatory intent in selective prosecution cases in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Armstrong. It discusses various commentators' readings of Armstrong related to the standard required in order to prove discriminatory intent, and it recommends use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the scheme used in employment discrimination cases based on race, as the best approach to solving this problem.