• Ph.D. in Economic Analysis, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain, 1998.
• MS. in Mathematics with honors, St.Petersburg State University, 1989.

Mechanisms to select a public decision (voting), divide the benefits from a shared resource within network, assign agents to objects or tasks, or match two sets of agents (like men and women or workers and firms) in pairs have many practical applications. The goal of the project is an extensive study of such mechanisms, removing traditional restrictive assumptions on possible preferences of agents between outcomes and on the deterministic nature of such rules. New rules are searched for and, along with the traditional ones, are evaluated in connection with whether they satisfy socially desirable properties, such as efficiency, incentive compatibility and fairness. [Project Details]

• Social Choice Theory and Welfare Economics
• Game Theory
• Microeconomics Theory

• Presenter, Public Choice Society Meeting, San Antonio, Texas, March, 2001
• Presenter, SETI Conference, Houston, Texas, October, 2000
• Presenter The first World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Bilbao, Spain, July, 2000
• Presenter Social Choice and Welfare Meeting, Alicante, Spain, June, 2000
• Presenter Conference on Economic Design, Istanbul, Turkey, June, 2000
• Visiting Associate, California Institute of Technology, USA, 1999
• Postdoctoral Fellowship, CREST-LEI, ENPC, Paris, France, 1998

• Bogomolnaia, A. and Nicolo A.,1999, "Multiple locations with congestion: normative solutions", in: Logic, Game theory and Social choice; Proceedings of the International Conference LGS 99, ed. H. de Swart, Tilburg University Press, 92-103.
• Barbera, Salvador, Bogomolnaia, Anna and van der Stel, Hans, 1998, "Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers", Math. Social Sci. 35, no. 2, 89--103; MR 99d:90034.
• Bogomolnaya, A. V., 1995, "On the Fourier coefficients of functions concentrated on a subset of the circle", J. Math. Sci. 73, no. 6, 633--637; MR 96b:42007.