TARGET: G.I. JANE
A Look into Military
Sexual Assault
by Tiffany Jenson
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I want to acknowledge my research project mentor, Dr. Richard Hawkins, of the Southern Methodist University Sociology Department, for helping me “sharpen my saw” as a researcher.
Many thanks to the Office of the Inspector General for their investigation of past incidents in 1991 at the Las Vegas Tailhook Conventions, which helped contribute to a theoretical basis of analysis.
I also want to acknowledge those victims and their families who have openly shared their stories to the press and other agencies to contribute to the public knowledge of the scope of the problem. Their courage is what makes this exploratory research possible.
PREFACE
As I began this project, I realized sexual assault was not just a problem with the Air Force Academy, or a problem with the military. It was an institutional problem created by both military and civilians alike within a society torn between dignity and pleasure, justice and advantage, honor and lust. Female victimization seems to always have existed whenever women took any part in military operations, whether in ancient times or the modern day.
I realized it would not be enough to only cover the Air Force Academy’s internal issues. I needed to discover the military social norms joining all branches of the service and all their academies. Although the primary focus of my research has been on the results of recent Air Force Academy events, comparisons within the Virginia Military Institute, Tailhook, and Dover Air Force Base seemed unavoidable.
I drew my conclusions from researching the past experiences of other institutions have already survived what the AFA is going through. I decided to predict future activity and recommend alternatives to traditional solutions.
To begin, I draw on a historical context in the events of Tailhook and other cases. This allows us to then identify the male military hierarchies present in the system, while bringing to light relevant numerical data. Military norms and expectations are also explored to ascertain needed social paradigm shifts that will further facilitate the socialization of the female soldier as a way to prevent victimization.
I decided it was critical to hear directly from the reporter John Ferrugia’s mouth, the reporter who elevated these cases to national attention in March of 2003 and whose findings are covered in Appendix B, and how he discovered the disillusions of female cadet life at the Air Force Academy. So I included a transcript of his original interview when he broke the story this past spring, an interview that lead to many investigations by major broadcast networks. He asked all the right questions and knew the issue went much deeper than it showed on the surface. I credit his work for igniting my interest in this area.
As the issue unravels, we expose the reporting issues and systemic flaws. To address those issues we then look into leadership plans already in place and future plans being considered.
I’m grateful for the openness of each victim who shared her story, and who inspired me to further my research.
A HISTORY OF ASSAULT
In early 2003, the sexual assault history of Air Force Academy cadets was exposed to the national media. To gain a historical perspective on such assaults, one can look into events such as the 35th Annual Tailhook Symposium, which brought together naval and air force communities in September of 1991 at a Las Vegas hotel where women were assaulted during evening festivities. Also reviewed is the integration of women at the Virginia Military Institute to see how poor socialization of women into military programs provides the basis for an assault environment. The assaults that occurred at this convention elicited less than adequate responses from government officials, military governing units, and the general public. Indeed, actions were taken by the officials only when it was absolutely necessary and, in many cases, too late.
The Tailhook Association is an association for the naval aviation community that is separate from, but sponsored by, the United States Navy. This association hosts annual symposiums, in which the naval aviators, among others, are invited to view exhibits and attend presentations about the latest advancements in aviation. They also congregate with one another through enjoyable outings such as golf tournaments, cocktail parties, and 5K runs.
Unfortunately, especially in cases of indecent assault, “an atmosphere was permitted to develop over a period of years which encouraged officers to act in inappropriate ways.” (Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, xii) More and more over the years, as the symposium was held, officer behavior became increasingly disruptive, and full of what the Navy would describe as “behavior unbecoming an officer,” which seems a mild description by any measure. The symposium’s atmosphere readily encouraged deviant social activity. With cocktail parties each night, exclusive access to private rooms, and hallways blocked or unregulated by hotel security, one can imagine the incidents that followed. Soon, social traditions developed that were contrary to Naval policy. The symposium became more of a reason to party than to promote military advancement.
Statistics from the 1991 Tailhook Symposium are astounding as well. Ninety victims were identified as having experienced indecent assault and 140 officers were referred for possible court-martial or disciplinary action. Among events reported at the symposium were officers publicly exposing themselves, streaking, butt biting, and leg/pubic area shaving for women. Another event, “The Gauntlet,” involved luring or forcing unsuspecting women where they would be groped, assaulted, or disrobed by hundreds of naval officers who lined the walls also occurred. Surprisingly, though, many officers stated that, “[the 1991 Gauntlet] seemed mild in comparison to previous years”. (Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, ix)
How did this problem escalate to such proportions? Admiral Kelso, the Chief of Naval Operations who conducted several investigations into the Tailhook scandal admits to a problem that the Navy had in socializing women into their aviation communities: “Tailhook brought to light the fact that we had an institutional problem with women…it was a watershed event that has brought about cultural change.” (Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, ix)
In many respects, “Tailhook” was considered a needed event to bring leadership failure and institutional weakness to light. Nevertheless, ninety victims seems a high price to pay for bringing about those types of reforms. The Office of the Inspector General, assigned to issuing the official report for the Department of Defense, recognized several causes behind these events. The debased attitudes of the officers the controversies of women in combat and women’s role in aviation generally, and the failure of leadership all combined to create the victimization of 21 naval officers, 6 government employees, 6 military spouses, and 49 civilian (non-military related) women. (Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, xiv)
Evidence suggests that the officers attending these conventions were exhibiting this sort of behavior years before it was unveiled by the media. Many investigators found that these assaults could have been prevented with appropriate leadership action. In fact, the failure to act according to proper military protocol was probably the most commonly committed offense at the symposium.
Article 92: Failure to act. ‘Failure to act’ is punishable as a dereliction of duty. The elements of that offense are: (a) That the accused had certain duties; (b) That the accused knew or reasonably should have known of the duties; and (c) That the accused was (willfully) (through neglect or culpable inefficiency) derelict in the performance of those duties. (Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 92)
There were many accusations that hosting officials were aware of the behavior, allowed it, and that some even participated in it. Many top Navy officials were transferred, demoted, or forced to resign as a part of their punishment. The court martialing of the officers seemed mild in comparison to these measures suffered by their commanding officers. This is an institutional irony that “failing to act” can cost you your military career while sexual assault may only cause an officer to be demoted in his/her ranking. There is a discrepancy in the manner in which indecent assault is defined in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), as demonstrated in Article 134.
Article 134: Indecent assault. The elements of the offense are: “(1) That the accused assaulted a certain person not the spouse of the accused in a certain manner; (2) That the acts were done with the intent to gratify the lust or sexual desires of the accused; and (3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the Armed Forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces. (Uniform Code of Military Justice)
Element one defines the victim, the act, and allows us to discover that the military views spousal assault as non-punishable by military law. This brings to light that the six military spouse victims from the Tailhook incidents of 1991 would not have been protected if their husbands were in the Gauntlet. Stated in Element one, is a “certain” manner. How delicate must the manner be in assault cases? Most codes and laws hold individuals to a “sexual” manner, as described by the victim and the assailant. This military code also sees it necessary to get to the particulars of the assault. Element two requires the assailant to intend a personal gratification. Element three further states that the “discredit of the Armed Forces was part of the intent of the assailant.” Evidently, the Military Code itself establishes expectations of behavior that set up this institution for failure in legal battles.
HISTORICAL CASES
A former female captain in the Air Force who was stationed in Germany on active duty was told by a Master Sergeant that some of the young GIs were targeting the newly arriving younger female GIs, i.e. getting them drunk, so they could rape them. She went to the military prosecutor, who was also female, for assistance. After going through the facts, the prosecutor told her that, “alcohol is consent” and that she couldn’t do anything for them. This captain decided to write an article for all officers stationed in her area. She covered both ends equally, even speaking of female privates who were wrongly accusing males, and could be prosecuted for false testimony. The prosecutor approved the article and copies went to all senior base officials to gather support and have it published in the base paper. Unfortunately, very little response was found, as it was never published in the base paper after this captain left the base for a new assignment. This very same captain later became a victim of assault by two senior officers. She was groped, grabbed, and humiliated. She said it was difficult to find help while trying to maintain her military career and that the predators were really the military complaint system. She suffered many consequences of trying to find justice, being told at one point by an officer among her troops that if she didn’t leave her job, “those men would kill you.” She then resigned after her 9-year military career, and went as a civilian to her local police agencies and received the same common result, “sorry you were in the military; we can’t help you.” She stated that national security is nothing more than a secret national scandal. She had just entered civil court to get her basic rights heard and to the Justice Department three times, with very few results. She recently found out that the Justice Dept. has currently provided her predators with free counsel as they move into federal court. She even faces a defamation suit from one of the senior officers as a means to intimidate her into silence. (Brower, John M and Dorothy H. Mackey, 1)
In addition to this former Air Force Captain, the Meester family has been faced with their son’s sexual assault charges in the Air Force Academy. Douglas Meester, the cadet’s father, believes that a decision to court-martial his son is politically motivated because of the recent scandal outbreaks. They don’t want their son to be made a scapegoat. In court, they will try to assert that the decision was made because of the influence of a higher command authority, which is contrary to Air Force’s mores. If proven so, Meester can file motions to be allowed to resign in lieu of court-martial or ask for a change of venue. (Emery (C), 1)
A MILITARY HIERARCHY OF MEN
It is no surprise that women are held to different standards than men when it comes to seeking justice within the military setting. They must utilize, or some would say “exhaust,” all of their military options, before they get any sort of standing in civil or federal courts. Women have to deal with the issue of bureaucratic barriers that obstruct them from their chance to be heard. It turns into a game of “survival of the fittest” with all the regulations women must abide by. Many would point out that women must have been aware of the heavily regulated society that they were joining. What has been called into question is the comparison of military protocol for men versus for women in dealing with behaviors counter to military norms.
One woman made numerous attempts to resolve her issue within the parameter of military agencies and individuals, and then she found herself calling upon the local civilian authorities, police, sheriff, and FBI. Still, she was told that she “couldn’t be helped.” A contributing factor seen here would be the difficulty of the separation between civic life and military life. Victims must select which system to utilize in their case and abide by the corresponding norms associated with it. But when faced with military career decisions and reluctant civilian involvement in “military affairs”, those decisions can create a larger penalty on the victim, rather than the assailant.
Some women have reported that upperclassmen or higher-ranking officers have used their rank to coerce them into sex. Sexual assault reporting is also likely to happen in a military environment where the appropriate response and protection cannot be found. One-fifth of those women reporting rapes while in military service said they believed “rape was to be expected in the military.”
RELATED STATISTICS: FEMALES IN THE MILITARY
Women continue to be an extreme minority in the military, making up only 15 percent of active-duty troops. And out of 873 general officers across the armed services, just 34 are women, or 3.9 percent, comparable to 15.7 percent of women leading Fortune 500 companies. (McAllister, 1) Women’s leadership roles in society have become more clearly defined since the 1970s, yet researchers say there are still disproportionate numbers as far as American business leadership is concerned. To determine whether or not the military environment is better or worse in comparison to the civilian population regarding rape cases, one must examine and distinguish between reported and unreported rapes of each population.
The statistics are noteworthy, but the real issue here is about the mishandling of sexual assault complaints, specifically by the Air Force Academy. Experts say that this has become one of the largest military sexual misconduct scandals since the Navy's Tailhook fiasco in 1991. The Air Force investigated 54 reports of sexual assault or rape over the past ten years at the Academy. While they tell the public that no one has been absolved of responsibility, they also admit that surprisingly few prosecutions have taken place. (McAllister, 1). Indeed , according to a 1994 report by the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of the military, it was found that 78% of the 90 female cadets at the academy actually did report either sexual assaults or unwanted sexual advances in a timely manner after the incident. (McAllister, 1)
MILITARY AND INSTITUTIONAL NORMS
In the second stanza of the code in Appendix A, we discover that cadets are called to a “responsibility to confront other cadets on suspected violations of the Code”. This sets forth an institutionalization of cadet scape-goating, and frivolous accusations. Some Honor Code violations result in what the Air Force Academy calls “disenrollment,” which is similar to a dismissal without honor. However, in other cases the cadet may be suspended and placed on honor probation. But are the suspensions and honor probations severe enough to provide adequate deterrence?
Listed also in the code is further explanation that, “If the commandant's recommendation is for disenrollment, the case will be sent to the Superintendent. At any point during the honor process, the cadet may elect to resign.” This option provides cadets with the opportunity to back out of the problem, ascertaining that “resignation retains honor” but effectively allows for the avoidance of responsibility.
The Honor Code continues that, “Cadets who live under the Honor Code agree it is a vital part of their development as military professionals. It also represents a broader aspect of ethical maturity, which will serve them throughout their lives. As the bearers of the public trust, both as cadets and as officers, it is the Honor Code, which helps build a personal integrity able to withstand the rigorous demands placed up them.” This section invokes honor to be held inside and outside the academy, which could be called into serious question at the Air Force Academy.
BEHAVIORAL EXPECTATIONS
The military has always carried a proud tradition of strict discipline and propensity to always follow orders. It has even been reported that, at times, Air Force Academy cadets have slept on the floor rather than wrinkle their beds for fear of reprisal. If only that same discipline and fear of stigma or punishment inhibited the academy rapist. It has been suggested that command leaders have not come down upon orders against assault and rape or that those policies are not taken seriously.
Alcohol not only relaxed the policy, but it played a major role in many of the Air Force Academy assaults.. The AFA averaged 30 to 40 cases of alcohol possession per year, which is significantly less than other colleges. But it’s usually related to the stereotypical social college life that many young teens dream of having in their 20s. There seems to be an American fixation on getting blown away, being wasted, and continuously partying. Some blame a society that hasn’t taught teens and young adults how to socially drink responsibly anymore. The unregulated alcohol use at military events seems to perpetuate an on going problem with assault.
In order for these institutions to get a grasp of their sexual assault problems they also need to equally investigate their policies on alcohol use. At the very minimum, the Air Force Academy cadets should be continuously educated on appropriate use of alcohol as a means of preventing personal assaults or at least avoiding situations where potential assaults could happen.
THE PROBLEM EXPOSED
In Appendix B is a show transcript from “On Point.” a National Public Radio program originally aired March 11, 2003, from WBUR, Boston College where John Ferrugia, a reporter for Denver’s KMGH station, broke the story of multiple rapes at the United States Air Force Academy. Therein, when Mary Koss, Professor of Public Health at the Arizona College of Public Health, notes that, “The Air Force Academy is not required under the Campus Security Act enforced by the Department of Education to provide data concerning reported rape cases. They report their numbers to the Dept. of Defense or the Air Force specifically; we’ve seen inconsistencies there. So it’s difficult to ascertain.” When military academies are not clearly regulated by government acts, institutional problems arise here.
REPORTING ISSUES
Another weakness of the sexual assault situation at the academy is the student reporting system. Facing honor violations allows motives to constantly change for those students involved in the misuse of alcohol. By reporting the rape of a squadron member, they also can put themselves in jeopardy. This mostly all-student chain of command within a squadron gives upperclassmen nearly unlimited authority over underclassmen and has created havoc in the reporting system. The female freshman cadet mentioned above was told by her student superior that it was “up to her to decide what to do.” The female cadet was barely acquainted with the sophomore cadet who had sex with her as she slipped in and out of alcohol-induced blackouts. If a crime wasn’t committed then it was in the least an academy honor violation that demanded some attention. But in a “big fish eats little fish culture,” where rank takes on more meaning that just personal status, reporting of violations and crimes of this sort usually do not happen.
We can see that there is a long history showing little progress with regard to the handling of rape cases. “Committees recommended policy changes as long ago as 1976 - when women were first admitted to the service academies - regarding how rape complaints and victims were treated, records show.” (Investigators say that in times preceding the national outbreak of military rape scenarios, they had difficulty in getting the military to provide data on rape, sexual assault, or sexual pressure. Air Force leaders did finally confirm that these cases exist, but only after intense Congressional and media scrutiny. (McAllister, 1)
In a recent sexual assault episode at Air Force Academy, a freshman cadet believed she had been raped while in a drunken stupor. So she reported it to her squadron's student superintendent. The problem in her case was the fact that the student superintendent provided some of the liquor that contributed to her assault. While alcohol compounds reporting problems, it becomes obvious that the fault lies with such systemic flaws in the reporting system.
SYSTEMIC FLAWS & POOR DEFINITIONS
The largest concern in the Air Force Academy investigations has been its loopholes within the system that can allow rapists to avoid criminal prosecution. Those loopholes are inherent in military law, due it its mission to remain distinct from civilian law. “Experts say military law, which defines rape differently than civilian statutes, is too narrow to cover ‘acquaintance rape’. Most of the recent rape reports at the Air Force Academy involved ‘acquaintance rape’.” (
“Acquaintance rape” is a common form of rape in society. About 80 percent of the rapes seen in local civilian clinics near the academy are “acquaintance rapes” of girls or young women of high school or college age, and many of the incidents involve alcohol. (Marks are rarely seen upon the victim with acquaintance rape and it doesn’t often surface if someone is held down, due to the fear or shock that the victim experiences when their assailant is familiar to them. Oftentimes, the victim is even paralyzed with drugs. (
When crime is committed and victims choose not to use resistive force, they are never blamed for causing the crime or making it worse, because their fear is understood. The military seems to miss this important sociological aspect about victimization, and as a result even perpetuates acquaintance rape. (
Military law states that: “Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse by force and without consent is guilty of rape and shall be punished by death.” (A punishment yet to be used.) ( While Colorado law states that: “An actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to coerce the victim to submit; the victim is physically helpless; the actor has substantially impaired the victim's power to appraise or control the victim's conduct by employing, without the victim's consent, any drug, intoxicant, or other means for the purpose of causing submission.”
Rape requires “force” according to The Uniform Code of Military Justice or “UCMJ”. But the code fails to cite other powerful influences in these cases, such as rank. Rapists can use rank to pressure or lure their victims. Colorado and most other civilian rape statutes in the United States address many of those influences specifically and for that very reason. (Moffeit, Miles and Amy Herdy, 1)
Civilian rape counselors reported that superiors told many cadets that their assaults did not “fit” the military's definition of rape. Force is often subject to broad interpretation in military trials.
The command informed the father of one rape victim who was attacked last year while bedridden in her dorm recovering from pneumonia that because she knew her assailant, it would make a “legal difference.” The cadet eventually quit the academy as a result of commanders horribly mishandling her case, and telling her it was “her fault.” She felt she had made the mistake of previously associating with her attacker. (Moffeit, Miles and Amy Herdy, 1)
Unfortunately, this experience is not unique to the Air Force Academy alone. At Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, a rape victim said she experienced similar treatment. She was discouraged from prosecuting her attacker for the same reason she had previously met him. Since what happened to her does not meet the legal definition, the military acts as if she were not raped, as if it simply did not happen. (Moffeit, Miles and Amy Herdy, 1)
Civilian experts say that the military laws covering sexual assaults need serious revisions, and probably by those who drafted the civilian laws. It would seem that the military is normalizing rape, or at least holding it to such vague standards that it permits it as a part of the pains of military life.
According to the U.S. Justice Department, more than 6 in 10 civilian rape or sexual assault cases involve an intimate partner, relative, friend or acquaintance. (Pedersen, 1) “That trend holds true in the cases known so far at all the military academies. Now, as the Pentagon and Congress examine how the academy has mishandled rape cases and as additional stories emerge about strikingly similar problems at West Point and the Naval Academy - experts say it's time to re-examine how the law itself treats victims.” (
Family advocates for victims of military violence said that, “The elements of force, consent and sexual history need to absolutely mirror the civilian system.” (
To be considered in a court martial for rape, it must be known whether or not the victim was acquainted with her attacker. When a relationship exists, it “does not render a rape-charge case ‘prosecutable’” under the military justice code. (Yet, the definition of “force” can vary. So in situations where the victim is completely incapacitated, “force” may only mean what is minimally required to achieve sexual intercourse. Recommendations include removing their terminology of “force” completely.
Defense attorneys for some cadets have told officials that they have never felt that the laws of military code were adequate enough to prosecute someone. ( So if the law remains unchanged, it will still be open to dangerous interpretations by military courts, and victims will remain vulnerable to those interpretations. Commanders misinterpreting the law are usually never challenged, which points back to the traditional military hierarchy of general officers being treated like kings, with a higher, almost god-like interpretation of the law. Recommendations include removing the terminology of “force” completely. Since commanders often are investigating their own employees, they lack legal training, which also adds to the problem. (
SETTING THE PRECEDENT
Over the last twelve years, between 1990 and 2002, six cadets were tried in the academy's military court on charges ranging from rape to indecent acts. Five of the cadets were convicted, and one was acquitted. Many victims currently say they have never reported their crimes because they knew that many other cases were handled in secret administrative hearings, which would not necessarily do justice to the victim. (McAllister, Bill and Amy Herdy, 1)
The Meester case, referenced earlier, could set a new precedent with the legal instructions given. It says, “Both lack of force and consent are necessary to the offense….An act of sexual intercourse occurs by force and when the accused uses physical violence or power to compel the victim to submit against his/her will.” (Emery (B), 1) In the Meester case, the victim fell asleep due to intoxication, then she was raped. When a victim is incapable of consenting because she is asleep, unconscious, or intoxicated (to the extent that they lack the mental capacity to consent), no greater “force” is required than what is necessary to achieve penetration
These cases often cross both military law and fundamental rights involving privacy issues. Anonymity comes into play because the Air Force cannot guarantee to maintain any victim’s anonymity, especially when that cadet gives authorities sufficient evidence to charge another cadet with rape. Captain Peter Kerr of the academy stated in defense that, “Protecting anonymity cannot be guaranteed in those cases in which we have sufficient evidence to prosecute. In order to successfully prosecute criminal cases, our legal system guarantees those accused of crimes the right to face their accuser.” (Emery, (C), 1)
When reading between the lines it becomes evident. by this example, that the academy and the military generally “cherry-pick” which rights are guaranteed to officers, and which are forfeited under military law.
A FEMININE SOLUTION?
In the wake of the not so long ago Tailhook Convention tragedy in 1991, Academy Superintendent Lt. Gen. John Dallagher, speaking Friday o n ABC's “20/20”, said [the Air Force Academy rape scandal] was as serious as Tailhook, when women at a hotel were groped or assaulted by drunken pilots at a Navy booster group's convention. Determined to address the fears of many female cadets feeling that reporting rape means getting a demotion or a dismissal from the academy, he has appointed four new commanders, including two females, who will replace four other leaders recently terminated. (Janofsky, 1)
Controversy has arisen about the efficacy of bringing in females to correct such a politically incorrect institution. After all, the academy waited over twenty years to bring down a large block lettered sign near the entrance that stated “Bring Me Men,” even though females have been admitted into the academy since 1976. (Emery, (A), 1) Many feel that the gender of these new leaders has nothing to do with institutional effectiveness. Many ask does being a woman really matter in this circumstance? “By and large, active-duty and retired female commanders say they are no more sympathetic than men to problems faced by other women in uniform. After all, one of the ousted leaders [from the Air Force Academy] was a woman. And from discrimination to assault, female leaders say that showing greater empathy diminishes their strength as officers. Jobs they say they fought too hard to get.” (
The difficult task is already at hand; striving for “gender blindness.” Some female leaders refuse to even answer questions about what being a female officer is like because they don’t want to be seen as “different”. Barbara Spyridon Pope, who was the assistant Navy secretary during the 1993 Tailhook scandal reiterated, “What happened at the Air Force (Academy) wasn't a gender issue. It was failure of leadership to respond to a crisis. It's easy to say they were gender issues, but it's much more severe than that.” (Janofsky, 1)
If anything, female gender seems to these leaders to be a hurdle to overcome. In fact, Carol Mutter, a three-star general, in the U.S. Marine Corps said that she tired of watching women “skirting” their way around the field by “batting their baby blues” to the male officers. In order to strengthen women in the service she would have special lunches for younger female soldiers where they could get tips on how to take a modest shower in the field, how to act in a Muslim country with tight feminine control, and which sports bras were best during basic training. "He will never be a female soldier. He will never be a female Marine. She will have experiences that a man will never have," said Mutter, 57, who retired in 1999. (Sherry, 1)
Victims, at best, should be prepared for the “tomboy take over” of the female commanders in the current Air Force Academy. Hopefully these commanders’ past experiences with other female officers hasn’t corrupted what they judge femininity to be in the service and how that impacts female cadets as rape victims. It will be interesting to see how they lead the academy into this reconstructive stage. Young female officers and cadets reach out to women in leadership positions because they believe a superior of the same gender would be more understanding. Until 1967, only 2 percent of all enlisted soldiers were “allowed” to be women. Historically, the highest position women could hold, as a Marine, was colonel. Today, at the Air Force Academy, 18 percent of the 4,000 plus student enrollment are women.
The armed services culture differs markedly from the civilian world. It presumes a distinct trust and closeness, and it involves incomprehensible stress. Which is something that women are feeling more and more drawn to because of the challenges and respect they desire.
FAILURE TO LEAD:
THE CASE OF DENISE ARROYO
Failing leadership seemed prevalent in the case of Denise Arroyo, a female officer sexually assaulted at Dover Air Force Base. Her military family advocate, representing her in her efforts to seek justice, said officials never took the case seriously as a rape case. The officials also declined to take it to trial despite strong evidence, including what was characterized as positive test results from a rape kit that supported Arroyo's sexual-assault allegations. The family advocate also noted that Denise’s captain seemed only to want to talk about the fact that Denise had been drinking. (Moffeit, 1)
Denise was attacked shortly after she and her friends, which included her attacker, were "hanging out drinking" in her room. She started to feel dizzy so several of her friends tried to help her into bed. She left her room for a moment and returned, noticing an airman going through her closet. She asked what he was doing and asked him to leave. She immediately felt dizzy and fell on her bed. At that point the airman lunged on her and began ripping her pants off, and soon raped her. (Moffeit, 1)
Eventually, Arroyo was able to shove him back and run into the bathroom to escape him. When she later returned to her room her was still there, she screamed at him to leave and he finally did. She immediately called a friend, who told her to report it to the base police. Investigators with the Office of Special Investigations took evidence at her room and escorted her to the hospital. She was also administered a rape kit. (Moffeit, 1)
Representatives for Denise Arroyo and military officials exchanged phone calls over the next few weeks, and Arroyo was excused to return home to her family to recuperate. Later, she said an officer threatened her with penalties if she did not return to her base soon. That same officer transferred her from her regular job to the same dining facility where her alleged rapist worked. The Arroyo family and other advocates stressed to base officials that they wanted the airman prosecuted and Arroyo provided protection from any further harm. Eventually, after letters written by family and others were sent to the Department of Defense, action was taken to address her safety. (Moffeit, 1)
Dover Base officials reported to Ms. Arroyo that if she cooperated that she would be released of her services, and that she had a strong case because of the rape kit and the suspicions that attacker also was involved in other base rapes. Everything seemed to point toward a conviction of the assailant. Yet, over the next few months, officials at Dover Air Force Base started to doubt whether or not it was a criminal case, because it lacked a physical brutality found in other high-profile rape cases. Officials further mentioned that blood tests showed alcohol in Arroyo's bloodstream. It seemed as if her case “didn’t make the cut.” After her hearing, in which Arroyo testified against her attacker, she reported that she was pressured by a captain not to testify in a possible trial. Suddenly, base officials told her that the rape-kit results were not strong enough to seek a criminal penalty, completely contradicting their earlier statements. She felt her case was eventually “shelved” by the base. (Moffeit, 1)
She was disappointed. Especially given the fact that this attacker was very likely to have committed other base rapes. Arroyo and her advocates kept working on the commanders about prosecuting her attacker. The command would simply say, “It's up to Gilbert.” (Moffeit, 1) The case was dropped, ironically, because at about that time, “Gilbert”, or Brigadier General Gilbert, was appointed to lead the Air Force Academy. This brings to mind another important military code of addressing the act of omission. “Failure to act is punishable as a dereliction of duty under Article 92 of the UCMJ. The elements of that offense are:
‘(a) That the accused had certain duties; (b) That the accused knew or reasonably should have known of the duties; and (c) That the accused was (willfully) (through neglect or culpable inefficiency) derelict in the performance of those duties.’”
It would be reasonable to expect that assault cases when analyzed in the context of following due process, would include those of administrators who failed to respond to those cases just like Denise Arroyo’s.
CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENTS
The threats of dismissal and disciplinary violations hardly seem like incentives to report sexual assaults in the military arena. But that’s exactly what most victims had previously faced. “The academy now has instigated an amnesty program guaranteeing, at least in theory, that assault victims won't be punished for related lesser violations, such as drinking or fraternizing with upper classmen. Freshmen must take a course to learn how to avoid potentially dangerous circumstances, including situations that might develop within personal relationships. A 24-hour rape hot line was set up in 1996.” (
But these measures have not necessarily been effective in prevention to date. The hot line has received 99 complaints of various sexual offenses, from inappropriate touching to rape. That equals a rate of more than 12 per year, or more than one a month. So far, two cadets have been convicted for off-campus sexual offenses.
The Air Force Academy has promised the public to go further with reform by having the Inspector General's Office investigate every sexual harassment case ever filed at the academy to see if due process was followed. They also will initiate a more proactive approach by having the three other service academies investigated as well to see if similar problems exist.
It is not to say that the academy did not react to any previous allegations. In 1993, the academy established the Center for Character Development to promote ethical conduct for cadets. Freshmen cadets also enroll in a course called “Street Smarts” to learn how to protect themselves in potentially dangerous situations, including personal relationships. Last year, the academy increased its classroom emphasis on ethics amidst the biggest drug scandal in the school's history where 38 cadets were implicated. The case comes as the academy tries to adopt measures called for in an initiative called “The Agenda for Change,” a document released in late March 2003. It resulted in the removal of four leaders and more than 40 policy changes. Yet some have already doubted the new leadership brought in to continue moving the “Agenda For Change” forward. (United States Air Force Academy, (B), 1)
Josiah Bunting is one of the hired hands placed on a commission to examine the culture that led to dozens of sexual assaults against women at the academy. Ironically, he led the Virginia Military Institute through a legal fight to keep women out of his state-supported school after the nation's military academies were beginning to admit them. Interestingly enough, with the Virginia Military Institute, it took a 1996 order of the Supreme Court to get women into VMI.
Members of Congress were moved by Josiah Bunting’s efforts to re-focus his same school pride that kept women out to move them successfully into the ranks. It also appears politically comfortable, as the Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper is a VMI graduate. Bunting has been criticized previously but uses his faithful adherence to the law as his defense. “To Bunting’s own defense he’s stated that when you are given an order with which you disagree, you must call on yourself to execute it with renewed effort. We fought the fight (to stay all-male) on principle. We lost it. So we said, ‘Let's become co-ed in a way that brings pride to the institution.’ Our goal was to give women an absolutely fair shake.” (
Interestingly, VMI was rewarded for its delay in institutional changes. The school learned from the mistakes of people who changed prior to 1996, and their track histories have proved valuable for VMI. The Air Force Academy seems to have no comparable military academy with which to use this strategy. VMI also has a fairly comparable female make-up with 12 percent of its incoming class as women while the Air Force Academy sports 19 percent. Josiah Bunting’s strategy of female integration does have some merit. He offers great attention to detail. He went after the worst part of VMI's “boys’ club mentality.” That mentality created anger and resentment toward change, and that was the first thing that had to go. Bunting involved as many cadets in as many ways as possible especially the cadets he calls “persons of influence.” He spoke of the popular and charismatic people in the crowds, not necessarily the usual leaders - the student body president, the commander of the cadet corps, the football star, and the academic whiz. These “popular people” may be average students, marginal athletes and “military underachievers”. But Bunting still calls them natural leaders that attract folks. They bring acceptance of a point of view that is easy for others to accept and follow. The “Common John” has social pull to be tapped. (Spencer, (B), 1)
The project spun even further than just the students, even involving the alumni the most difficult group to win over. VMI's grads are probably more hard-core than the Air Force Academy's, especially with self-formed clubs such as one with the unofficial designation of “LCWB” (Last Class Without Breasts). VMI's alumni despised women in the ranks so much that they personally funded much of the court battles. They also funded a “separate but equal” military program for women at a private women's college as an alternative for women applicants. Bunting’s alumni strategy went straight to their sense of duty as military personnel. He told them that the Supreme Court’s decision was the new law of the land, and that if they are dutiful, honorable people, they will recognize it is the ultimate law that they need to uphold in the highest military tradition. His plans also included appealing to alumni and others to end the negative publicity campaigns. He integrated upper-class female cadets from other schools to help fill the ranks and assist the incoming female freshman at VMI. He also appointed several women to ranking positions in the commandant's office, a precedent followed by Air Force Academy in their current plan. (Spencer, (B), 1)
EMERGING THEORIES AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
Currently, there is a long list of contributing factors to this problem. We shall now attempt to list the major factors that have emerged. To begin with, there is the constant influence of a higher command of authority, primarily male, whose powers are not regulated in the same way that civic institutions regulate their leaders. This unbalanced power leads to weak internal protection systems on the individual level. The social separation between civic and military life, in regard to its systems of law, creates dissonance in a social enclave where civil rights are ignored, even violated, and military rights protect only those privileged individuals who happen to be of high rank or are male. There is a weak internal protocol and structure in place for handling victimization and this is the central problem to be addressed to begin directing social military behaviors toward a solution. As a start, the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s rape definition must be adjusted when examining the requirement of “force” It is this requirement that eliminates the possibility of pursuing prosecution.
In the Air Force Academy currently, victim reporting is based on relationships and knowledge of other assaulted women. The establishment of victim’s networks occurs due to the fact that victims cannot find any support or protection within the administration of the current system. Of course, the fear of retaliation factor must be eliminated for these victims, as stereotypes of “the victim as a traitor,” or the victim in the “act of betrayal,” and “the turning in of one of your own.” . The failure to fully integrate women at the Air Force Academy has contributed to honor codes and social norms that prevent women from achieving the justice and protection they deserve.
The “culture of rape” existing in the Air Force Academy prevails in producing an institutional support system for the “military rapist” because of faulty cadet honor code protocol. In addition to trying to eliminate this culture, the consumption of alcohol and its relation to assaults also must not be overlooked. When dealing with internal cultures it is important to involve existing agencies and counseling centers outside of the Air Force Academy. Internal agencies would be counterproductive in providing the truly unbiased and neutral presence that victims need.
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
Now we shall critique current Academy recommendations to the problem and also insert additional solutions. First, it was recommended that the Air Force Academy get rid of their co-ed housing units. Co-ed housing is unrelated to the problem, in that other campuses with female and male students living together do not have the problem with assaults that the AFA does. Again, the protocol, code, and culture should be addressed as a preliminary to any other considerations.
AFA has recently introduced the use of a rape hotline for victims. Again, internal solutions and agencies do not solve existing problems with AFA’s internal reporting culture. This kind of service should only be considered if performed by an external agency.
In beginning the revision of current military laws and academy honor code, Miles Moffeit and Amy Herdy from the Denver Post made valid recommendations when analyzing the civil statues and codes in comparison to the existing ones at AFA. They suggested that those who drafted the civilian laws draft the new UCMJ codes. Again, someone with legal training and expertise will prove to be the Air Force Academy’s best ally here, and an outsider’s perspective can prove to be most valuable.
Josiah Bunting of the Virginia Military Institute recommended that “persons of influence,” (charismatic people who are military achievers), be enlisted to help defeat the prior social norms once the right codes are in place. (A mentoring system will allow the AFA to move toward new norms of behavior when modeled by a group like the one he suggested.
My own suggested solutions would be to, first, give commanders who supervise cadet social activity the legal training they need to handle assault cases. They need to understand what rights are preserved in all systems including the honor code, military code, and federal and local laws and statues. Hopefully, these systems will already be in harmony with each other following the revision suggested previously in this section. Second, there must be a cognizant and devoted effort to teach female cadets how to integrate into military life as a cadet. This effort would allow female cadets to help prevent some assault activity and become more aware of the male and female military social norms that contribute to a safe campus environment. Third, there must be the creation of an academy amnesty program to address past cadets’ loss of military status and opportunity. To accompany that, of course, is the investigation of “due process” in prior assault cases. These recommendations address the past assaults and direct the way in which future assaults should be dealt with.
CONCLUSIONS
The Air Force Academy indeed has learned from fellow institutions and branches of the military and government. Lt. Gen. John Dallager, the man in charge of cleaning out the skeletons in the academy’s closet seems, at the very least, to have the energy and will to strive for higher standards and justice for past wrong-doings. Unfortunately, the academy plan is attacking the fire from the outside in, as a means of containment, instead of inside out, to really re-build and recreate internal policy. The policy re-drafting is essential to regaining and retaining justice. Programs, hotlines, and counselors can only do so much. They are bound with the military law tied around their hands.
Lt. Gen. Dallager says his focus will be on communication. Victims want legal action, not more therapy sessions and apologies. They want punishments, and clearly defined policy that they can trust. Perhaps John Dallager can communicate that to the Department of Defense. If you really want to create military cultural change two things must happen: a system of legal checks and balances must be maintained at the highest level, and there must exist the leadership in place to enforce that system. Military officers know the law, it’s their job to defend, honor, and sustain it. But law is nothing without societal meaning and endorsement. Hopefully, the Air Force Academy, other military institutions, and the government will be able to correct their mistakes, and prevent new ones from arising in the future.
Perhaps the words of Johnny Weida, Brigadier General and U.S. Air Force Acting Superintendent, can sustain the future soldiers of tomorrow, amongst a blackened and clouded past. “Don’t be further discouraged by this story. And don’t allow your personal goals to get sidetracked by public scrutiny of past activity by a few cadets who failed to internalize our institutional core values.” (Janofsky, 1) . It is a recommitment to the morals that the military does regularly maintain that will pull future cadets toward a safer academy life-style.
APPENDIX A
SECTIONS OF THE HONOR CODE OF THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY
"We Will Not Lie, Steal Or Cheat, Nor Tolerate Among Us Anyone Who Does"
“Lt. Gen. Hubert R. Harmon, the Academy's first superintendent, established a committee of noted civilian educators and Air Force officers to study the existing honor codes and systems throughout the country and provide recommendations on a code for the Cadet Wing. The resulting Honor Code has remained virtually unchanged since its overwhelming acceptance in 1956 and has been continually administered. Today, there are 164 cadets serving on the Honor Code committee.”
“The existence of the Honor Code presents many privileges and responsibilities to each cadet. A cadet's word is accepted as the truth at all times. Academic scores can truly reflect a cadet's individual effort and knowledge because of each cadet's expectance to adhere to the Honor Code. This adherence extends to a responsibility to confront other cadets on suspected violations of the Code. Such confrontations often result in a simple clarification of a misunderstanding and each cadet learns the value of clear communications in all situations.”
“The oath simply states, "We will not lie, steal or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does. Furthermore, I resolve to do my duty and to live honorably, so help me God." The Honor Oath recognizes that honor has a broader meaning than simply not lying, stealing or cheating. True honor requires active support of positive principles rather than simple abstinence from wrongdoing. The oath also affirms the closely related nature of the concepts of honor and duty. The phrase, "so help me God," is taken from the oath of office and affirms a higher standard of living.”
APPENDIX B
ISSUES EXPOSED AND THE PUBLIC RESPONSE:
JOHN FERRUGIA’S STORY
Show transcript from “On Point”, a National Public Radio program originally aired March 11, 2003, from WBUR, Boston College where John Ferrugia, a reporter for Denver’s KMGH station, broke the story of multiple rapes at the United States Air Force Academy. Also interviewed are: Tammy Jones, a rape victim as a cadet in 1982, Mary Koss, Professor of Public Health at the Arizona College of Public Health, and director of a non-profit unit offering services to victims of sexual assault.
NPR: “NPR News Source: Air Force Academy has found 54 cases over the last 10 years that have surfaced. And today, 15% of active duty troops are women. What permits a ‘culture of rape’ in the first place? Does this culture invite or even defend rape? John Ferrugia has been asked to describe latest developments.”
John Ferrugia:
“Well, as of today there is an Air Force investigative team that has returned to the academy…consisting of 17 investigators. They were here 10 days, and after they left we found and reported that they indeed had not spoken to any victims or officials at an off-base counseling center where victims had gone. So we had no idea what they were doing, excepting looking at the program and talking with Air Force Academy officials. Now they are talking to victims and the counseling center. At the center they found that over 30 women had come reporting rape or sexual assault over a 15 year period.”
NPR: “How did it become nationally known that the Air Force Academy had this problem?”
John Ferrugia:
“Initially, one or two people had emailed us telling us that they had been ‘disenrolled’ or kicked out, of the Air Force after reporting they were sexually assaulted. We investigated and tried to see if there was a pattern where women are coming forward and then were kicked out. We found that indeed that was true. It was difficult to widen the scope of the story because of the embarrassment. People felt isolated. There were horrible psychological things the victims themselves were dealing with. Lots of hurt; physical hurting inside. Our investigation started with one person, and we asked ‘Do you know anybody else?’”
“We began finding that female cadets would discover that other fellow female cadets were disappearing but they didn’t know why. Pretty soon we found 12 women.”
John Ferrugia Continued:
“Women in this climate are so indoctrinated and they are judged so severely, as freshman. They have absolutely no power; they do not have a voice. The Academy or their colleagues say to them ‘You have betrayed us.’ ‘You have turned in one of your own in.’ ‘You have caused pain and suffering to your unit of 30 people.’ ‘You are a traitor.’ Therefore they are totally ostracized. The victims became the persecuted, and immediately thought ‘I’ve done something wrong.’ They were put into a position where they thought that they had betrayed their fellow cadets. So when they left, they left in shame. They felt they were the person at fault. They were made to feel that way. That’s the tragedy of this. These are women who are bright and could’ve attended Harvard, Yale, or Stanford, and had the grades to do so, but who had the desire to serve their country. The real tragedy of this is, as a taxpayer, [is that] we have been robbed of their talent.”
NPR: “What was the Air Force Academy’s first response, and how has that response changed over time?”
John Ferrugia:
“Initially, we tried to talk to the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy, John Dallager, and asked for interview times three weeks before we ran the story. We didn’t hide the ball on these people. We shared all our findings with them. We told them what we had and exactly what we wanted to talk with them about, and essentially, they ignored us. They finally gave us a response from a Sexual Assault Director, who was a Major, and once we completed the interview we clearly knew that she had no info about the numbers, how broad the problem was, and very little interest in finding out how broad the problem was. They didn’t even tell General Dallager that we wanted to do an interview with him. They thought we were a local station and thought, just forget it, it will go away. Because that’s always what had happened before. Once we ran our stories and the academy realized what we had and that this was not just an isolated case, but a pattern of behavior, a systemic pattern, and a climate which we were talking about which accepted sexual assault, as a matter of course or process of getting through the academy, that’s when they finally took notice. That’s when Gen. Dallager called me on my cell phone and said, ‘What do you want to talk about?’”
NPR: “At this point, you’ve gotten the Pentagon, Congress, the Press, everyone’s attention, is there a sense now that the Air Force Academy is fully focused and determined to do something?”
John Ferrugia:
“Yesterday, at the White House, when the President’s concern was reported, that was a clear public message to the Air Force that it better get things together, and quickly. I’m not sure that top levels get it. At least the Secretary gets it, he knows the system needs to change and is adamant about making those changes, to make it possible for women to come forward, and report, without fear of retribution.“
NPR: “But that’s the Civilian Secretary, does that go into the heart of the Air Force?”
John Ferrugia:
“I don’t know that, I don’t know if the command structure of the Air Force gets it yet.”
NPR: “How would you describe the core of the problem here, what has gone wrong?”
John Ferrugia:
“The Air Force Academy, as an institution, is accepting of sexual assault of women, and rape of women within the academy. And it is a systemic issue. For instance, if a young woman reports that she was raped, let’s say on a Sat. evening, there is a rule that says, we may, it doesn’t say we will, it says ‘we may’, give you amnesty for anything else you might have been doing to further break cadet rules that night. For instance, if the young woman was drinking, or she were ‘fraternizing’, as it is called by being with upper classmen, etc., we’ll give you amnesty because we want you to come forward and we won’t give you any demerits for those cadet rules being broken. But, they then begin investigating the victim. And they talk to her roommate. And they talk to all of the witnesses who were there that night, and incidentally, none of those people get amnesty. So if she comes forward and says, ‘I was raped and there are two witnesses’, the two witnesses who may be classmates of hers, are in big trouble. They get no amnesty. That’s the first hurdle she has to overcome. Being a traitor to those people who are in her squadron. Then the Office of Special Investigation, which is essentially the FBI of the Air Force, they begin investigating the victim. And they go to those witnesses, and ask, ‘Have you seen the victim drinking on campus before?’ [They answer] ‘Well, yes, two weeks ago, on Thursday she did this.’ [They ask]‘Well has she ever fraternized?’ [They answer] ‘Yeah, last week she and two other women were at a movie off base with upperclassmen.’”
“So they begin compiling a list of ‘hits’ as they call them, demerits, and then they bring in the victim and say, ‘Well, now we’re going to give you amnesty for this particular thing that happened on Saturday evening, but is it true that you did this on Thursday and you did this last week?’ If she says ‘No’, she’s violated the honor code, which states ‘I will not lie, cheat, or steal’. And she’s gone. If she says, ‘Yes’, she is then given demerits and hours of physical punishment. So either way she’s put into a box. Those demerits could also be grounds for expulsion.”
NPR: “And what about the alleged rapist in this process?”
John Ferrugia:
“We have never found one case, not one case, where a cadet has been court marshaled for sexually assaulting another cadet. Ever.”
NPR: “Is the Air Force ‘red-faced’ about this?”
John Ferrugia:
“The Air Force, at this point, says each of those cases is an ‘individual case’. And therefore it cannot talk about ‘individual cases’. The bottom line is that women in the Air Force Academy know, if ‘I’m raped or sexually assaulted, then I will either be punished, or I will be kicked out. So therefore, if I want a career in the Air Force, I would say nothing.’”
NPR: “Comments from Tammy Jones, rape victim as a cadet at the United States Air Force Academy as a freshman.”
Tammy Jones:
“I came forward because others were coming forward. I was outraged that this was still happening 21 years later after I was raped in 1982.”
NPR: “What makes it a challenge to come forward?”
Tammy Jones:
“There’s a lot of change involved. I actually reported this to my chain of command, and I was completely shut down. The chain of command may include an upperclassman. My assailant was in my chain of command. It sets up a system where 19 and 20 year old kids can have complete and total authority over 18 and 19 year-olds.”
NPR: “Did it feel outside of the norm, or part of how life is at the Air Force Academy?”
Tammy Jones:
“I think it was ‘Suck it up, deal with it’. I was shocked. But by the time I spoke to other women about it, I found that they were not shocked that it had happened to me. Being among the first classes of women at the academy, I thought this was just a ‘thing you go through’.”
NPR: “What your view today?”
Tammy Jones:
“I think they have to change the entire culture and climate at the academy. Waiting at the door in basic training, we’re singled out. I never felt like they totally integrated women at the academy. It sets up a situation where the sexual harassment can lead to crossing other boundaries, [and can lead to] rape situations. It’s not a healthy climate overall.”
“A macho attitude does not need to be present in order to have a successful defense. Patriotism needs to replace machismo. Women have played an important role in the military since the beginning.”
NPR: “Now we’ll hear from Mary Koss, Professor of Public Health at the Arizona College of Public Health, and director of ‘Restore’, a nonprofit unit which offers services to victims of sexual assault and first-time offenders. Mary, why is the academy struggling with this?”
Mary Koss:
“It is common in workplaces that were formally all male, or where it is notable in institutions that measure success by having male qualities like aggressiveness and strength. Especially, at academies, though, where you have senior cadets overseeing freshman and sophomores. There’s an abuse of power.”
“Males in the military had very traditional gender role attitudes. And women who are seeking careers in non-traditional areas end up joining them, and they may conflict dramatically.”
“[In our studies] we want to know what is causing it, and what can be built into prevention programs. And how is the military addressing these issues. Are they communicating it in ways that ask for accountability to everyone?”
“At one point, documentation was distributed on how to detect false rape complaints. There was a list of characteristics that Air Force Inspectors were being taught such as ‘a woman who had been previously victimized’, etc.”
NPR: “Does the Air Force Academy’s cases exceed the norm in reported cases in colleges?”
Mary Koss:
“The Air Force Academy is not required under the Campus Security Act enforced by the Department of Education to provide data concerning reported rape cases. They report their numbers to the Dept. of Defense or the Air Force specifically; we’ve seen inconsistencies there. So it’s difficult to ascertain.”
NPR: “Some have mentioned the housing units on campus stating that ‘Proximity erodes the dignity of male female interaction’. Experts in sexual harassment say that’s the wrong approach to try to get rid of co-ed housing.”
Mary Koss:
“It’s only a short term
solution. It actually helped reduce sexual violence by the support of the
command [unit as a whole], support of the integration of women, etc. Women
are respected and honored for their visible capabilities, generally accepted
in these non traditional roles because everybody’s right there and can see
what they’re capable of.”
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