Prospects for Political Stability in Argentina

By Maria Lambert

            An unpredictable pendulum effect has characterized Argentina’s political past in which government control has alternated continuously from democratic to military regimes.  Most recently, Argentina has sustained a democratic government, albeit a shaky one, which economic failure and presidential instability during the last two years have only further unsettled.  While the pendulum has at least temporarily stopped at democratic rule, one must question as to whether Argentina’s government will swing out of control once more towards a military or authoritarian regime, or whether it will uphold democratic ideals.  Assuming that Argentina does succeed in maintaining a democratic form of government, the crucial uncertainty remains---can Argentina expect to develop into a modern, liberal democracy marked by stability, legitimacy, and efficiency? 

            Political scientists disagree on the central issue of whether Argentina can anticipate a modern, liberal democratic regime in the near future.  For example, Hector E. Schamis supports an optimistic outlook claiming that Argentina’s ability to remain a democracy despite the recent economic and political upheavals suggest a consolidation of democracy.[1]  Conversely, Charles Blake argues that in comparison to other countries with nascent democratic regimes such as Uruguay, democratic approval ratings indicate that Argentina lags behind in its creation of a self-reinforcing, liberal government and cannot expect consolidation in the near future.  Blake affirms that Argentina’s rapid implementation of democratic institutions has weakened its prospects for a fully realized democratic regime.[2]  Such controversy concerning Argentina’s political future arise because it does not cleanly adhere to the standards often utilized to measure democratic efficiency.  For instance, of the many indicators that Seymour Martin Lipset uses to measure the stability of a democracy, he considers education to have the strongest correlation with democratic support.[3]  However, Argentina who boasts extraordinarily high literacy levels for a Latin American nation according to the 1999 United Nations Development Programme, still has a population in which 50 percent of its constituents are “not very satisfied” with democracy--- a counterintuitive occurrence that invites controversy concerning political legitimacy.[4]  Evidently, a perfunctory analysis of one socioeconomic factor cannot provide an accurate prediction for Argentina’s political future; rather one must fully evaluate the political culture on several fronts in order to elucidate the nations’ democratic future.

            Although Argentina has the institutional trappings of democracy, whether it will develop into a stable, modern democracy hinges on its constituents and their willingness to support liberalism at all costs.  In order to measure the strength of Argentina’s political culture, I turned to Lipset, Francis Fukuyama[5], and Robert Putnam[6] for theoretical guidelines for assessing legitimacy and social capital within a society.  In order to provide substance to the application of such theories, I consulted opinion polls such as the heavily guarded “Latinobarometro” as well as census information to obtain quantitative data about culture.[7]  Although Argentina appears to have the requisite socioeconomic factors to create a participant political culture, ultimately a deficit in social capital destabilizes its government.  Thus, based on current levels of legitimacy and social capital, I have concluded that Argentina has not effectively inculcated the necessary democratic ideals to cultivate a participant political culture essential to the stabilization and modernization of its democratic form of government. Undoubtedly, myriad reasons contribute to Argentina’s substantial lack of legitimacy and social capital, but most notably an unstable political past marred by authoritarian regimes, a rapid implementation of democratic ideology, and a civically uninvolved and distrusting society have resulted in a reluctance to accept and to defend democracy.     

Argentina's Unsteady Political Past

In order to analyze the political culture of Argentina and its relation to the institutionalization of a modern, liberal democracy, one must first understand the tumultuous nature of its past that underlies its present political culture.  Upon awareness of Argentina's political history, one can observe a recurring phenomenon of instability—a trend that does not provide a sound foundation for the emergence of a political culture dedicated to liberalism.  

Sporadic shifts of power from democracy to authoritarian rule and vice versa have typified Argentina's political history over the course of the last century.  Militaristic forces routinely overthrew governments producing a past characterized by instability.  For instance, military coups ousted presidents in 1930, 1943, 1955, and 1976 showing that such organizations have exercised considerable influence over former governments.  Furthermore, the period lasting from the 1950s until the early 1970s suffered continual transitions of power from military to civilian rule and culminated with widespread guerilla activity.  In 1982, President Leopoldo Galtieri instigated an invasion of the Falkland Islands with the express purpose of drawing the nation's attention away from domestic turmoil and concentrating focus on foreign affairs---a misdirected political move that had grave repercussions.  Following this failed diversionary tactic, the public heaped blame upon the military, further worsening their views of the government and its armed forces.  Moreover, the public rallied against the military during the mid 1980s as several members of former military juntas faced trials for violating human rights during the disgraceful 'dirty war' of 1978 to1983.  Even in the past twenty years, violent revolts and protests have proliferated Argentina's history creating the impression that anything from a major economic crisis to disapproval of public policy reforms is impetus enough to send Argentines into a state of political aggression.  Evidently, Argentina's denizens have not characteristically responded in a peaceful manner to opposition of any type. While protest can indicate efficacious citizens vocalizing their needs in order to effect change, in this case, the preponderance of violent resistance signals that Argentines historically have exhibited low levels of trust and efficacy.[8]  

Social Capital and Interpersonal Trust

Paramount to the presence of social capital in a society is that one can assuredly place trust in his fellow man to cooperate and to reciprocate acts of goodwill.  Without such lines of confidence connecting citizens together, people have an incentive to default to autonomy, which results in a less efficient society.  Although government intervention can inspire interaction among citizens, political scientist Robert Putnam has found that “third-party enforcement is not generally a ‘stable equilibrium,’” and thus does not offer the best solution possible.  Therefore, a widespread lack of efficacy in one’s compatriots would signify a deficit of social capital and consequently a defect in the composition of a participant political culture in Argentina. [9]

  In order to measure adequately the amount of community trust in Argentina, I have utilized Fukuyama’s theories about social capital as well as opinion polls directly addressing issues of interpersonal trust.  First, Fukuyama cites that a significant abundance of crime and corruption among a society suggests a lack of social capital since each serve to deteriorate community trust levels.[10]  A cursory glance at Argentina’s political past indicates that at least on a national level institutions have been marked by corruption and fierce uprisings.  Taking into account that such pervasive transgressions of trust have occurred almost continuously since the 1920s, one can supposition that crime plays an integral part of Argentina’s political culture which consequently would result in low levels of trust among denizens on a broad scale.  Even Steven Levitsky, an optimist on the issue of Argentina’s prospects for democratic stabilization, cites crime as one of “the greatest challenges to the new government” and lists public security as another major concern for Argentines.[11]   The reaction of citizens during the economic crisis of 2002 verified this concern as panicked people resorted to Argentina’s familiar outlet of crime and aggression to express dissatisfaction.  As a result, 30 people died, and the nation experienced “disturbances throughout the country”.[12]  Such common instances of crime in the form of civic turbulence bolster the claim that Argentina exhibits sufficiently high levels of civil disobedience as to hinder the emergence of a significant amount of social capital. 

 Additionally, the opinion poll determined to measure Argentina’s amount of social capital conducted by Daniel Lederman offers inauspicious results regarding trust levels within communities.  Data from the nationwide survey paralleled generalizations gleamed from national and historical observations about the correlation between trust levels and the preponderance of crime.  For instance, only 33.1 percent of those surveyed trusted members of their community to handle “delicate matters” in a time of need---a figure that does not insinuate the existence of high amounts of social capital.[13]  The data taken from this survey in conjunction with national trends regarding the influx of crime suggests that Argentina’s denizens have a notable lack of interpersonal trust.

Social Capital and Civic Participation

Another indicator of trust levels within a society concerns participation rates among citizens.  Theoretically, since participation in associations requires the cooperation and trust of its members, one can conclude that involvement in organizations breeds efficacy and thus produces social capital.  Both Fukuyama and Putnam note that associating with various organizations contributes to the strengthening of bonds among individuals and results in raised trust levels.  Unfortunately, evidence reveals that the total participation rate of Argentines is only 19.7 percent---a figure that reveals a level of social capital well below average of other developing nations.[14]  In addition, at least half of those participating civically did so through homogenous organizations.  This statistic raises concern since groups that do not divide upon several politically salient cleavages are less likely to foster kinship across groups and effectively cultivate interpersonal trust.[15]  Based on quantitative data received from Argentines about civic participation, I affirm that Argentina does not possess sufficient amounts of social capital as derived from organizations and consequently agree with Lederman’s claim that “Argentina is probably on the lower end of social capital when compared to pre-existing international evidence.” [16]

Catholicism v. Liberalism

Unfortunately, simply participating in an organization does not necessarily guide one towards democracy.  Putnam further distinguishes between civic engagements exhibiting a horizontal network of shared power and those with vertical or hierarchical structures.  Putnam attests that horizontal organizations such as sports teams and other interest groups nurture democratic ideas by providing a heterogeneous mixture of participants that “nourish wider cooperation” and trust.[17]  Conversely, Putnam criticizes vertical institutions that emphasize a clear hierarchical nature observing that they “cannot sustain social trust and cooperation”.[18]  As Putnam has stated, hierarchical organizations often prove detrimental to the establishment of liberally minded political culture because such groups rely upon behaviors that are not effective when applied to democracy.  While he grants that in practice, most organizations exhibit a blend of the two extremes, the institutional Catholic Church specifically demonstrates a more vertically aligned and exclusive structure.  Because over 90 percent of the population consider themselves Catholic, one should scrutinize the relationship between institutional Catholicism and the development of a liberal political culture. [19]  While certainly not all ‘Catholics’ actually practice the religion regularly or defend the intricacies of its doctrine, such a high figure suggests that a significant portion of the population support this hierarchical institution on some level thus warranting analysis on this particular facet of Argentine culture.  

Associations with the institutional church generate problems on several accounts.  First, its doctrine advocates following pre-established, absolute rules and yielding to authority that typically remains in power until death.  On the other hand, for a democracy to work effectively, leaders must change at scheduled intervals and share power to prevent a dictatorship while citizens must believe that their opinions matter enough to effect change.   Evidently, the Catholic Church predisposes citizens to following a single leader obediently without dissent---a behavior exhibited in the public’s support of authoritarian leader Domingo Peron Sosa from 1948 to 1955. [20]  Obviously, a culture comfortable with deferring to absolute authority may not easily grasp the concept of democratic authority.  While Argentina has commenced the process of secularization as illustrated by the removal of the requirement that the president be a Roman Catholic in 1994, the government must recognize that changes within institutions do not create similar changes within cultures immediately and that traditionally Catholicism has meant, “being allied with rightist or conservative groups in politics.”[21]  While Catholicism and democracy can effectively coexist, undoubtedly the hierarchical structure of the church predisposes its fervent followers to accept liberal ideals with reluctance.  Policy makers thus should realize that Catholicism “invariably clashes with the liberalism, individualism, freedom, mobility, and sovereignty of the democratic nation” and work to involve devout Catholic within horizontally structured organization so that they can acquire the necessary values of democracy.[22] 

Some Social Requisites of Democracy

Seymour Martin Lipset outlines several other indicators of a culture conducive to maintaining a liberal democracy in addition to those of Putnam and Fukuyama.  Lipset considers that one can use levels of wealth distribution, industrialization, urbanization, and education to evaluate the legitimacy and effectiveness of a regime and, in turn, to place a country upon the scale of modernization.  Argentina, a nation bearing the necessary institutions of democracy yet arguably lacking the requisite political culture, surpasses most other Latin American nations in regards to these four areas of political legitimacy.  For example, Argentina maintains a considerable trade base, has admirable literacy rates for a South American nation, and has been considered “the wealthiest country ever to have suffered a democratic breakdown.”[23]  More significantly, Lipset identifies education as “the most important single factor differentiating those giving democratic responses from others” and a facilitator of the diffusion of the philosophies that cultivate democracy.  On the basis in which Argentina outshines its neighboring nations, many which have devastatingly low levels of literacy, one would suspect that support of democracy would naturally follow.  However, careful analysis of Lipset’s contention reveals that he grants education as only a “necessary condition in the modern world” and not essentially a “sufficient” indicator of a democratic institution.  Thus, Lipset’s theories concerning education can coincide with Levitsky’s conclusion that “education is not a robust predictor of interpersonal trust.” 

            In regards to the other factors believed to engender a participant political culture, one must note that fulfillment of these requisites only lay a foundation for a liberally minded society.  In Argentina’s case, a lack of social capital and a political past detrimental to democracy have already provided considerable indication that Argentina cannot sustain a liberal participant culture despite its institutional and socioeconomic readiness.

Legitimacy and Political Culture

Lipset further explains that stability rests upon the ability of an institution to respond to citizens’ diverse needs and to make democracy the only feasible and desirable form of government according to society.  When one applies Lipset’s theories regarding legitimacy to the case of Argentina, the nation does not emerge as a likely candidate to have achieved this level of political stability.  For instance, Lipset asserts that an upheaval of legitimacy can occur if a nascent government cannot “sustain the expectations of major groups for a long enough period to develop legitimacy upon the new basis.”  Argentina’s quick jump into democracy and subsequent economic and political failures give the impression that “major groups” may not have been wholly satisfied with the new regime.  Furthermore, Lipset states that a robust correlation exists between monarchy and democracy in that formerly autocratic regimes can transition more effectively to a democratic rule though the use of a monarch.  Argentina, however, leapt immediately from authoritarian rule to a presidential democracy setting the scene for legitimacy problems.  Moreover, Lipset takes the duration of an institution into his equation evaluating legitimacy avowing that “constant economic development” often serves to strengthen citizens’ trust in their form of government.  Obviously, the economic crises of 2001 and 2002 in which debt spiraled out of control did not instill a sense of trust in democracy among its citizens.  By utilizing the theories of Lipset vis-à-vis legitimacy in the context of Argentina, one can see that its political past does not provide an auspicious outlook.[24]

            In addition to the application of legitimacy theories, the data from such opinion polls as the “Latinobarometro” elucidate the issue of whether Argentina can expect political legitimacy in the near future.  Data taken from the survey initially appears contradictory in certain aspects.  For instance, while a considerable majority of citizens (71 percent) indicated a preference for democracy in lieu of other regimes, at the same time half of the respondents reported feeling “not very satisfied” with democracy.  Those optimistic about Argentina’s future would argue that the fact that so many respondents choose democracy despite low levels of satisfaction indicate high levels of efficacy since they have such faith in democracy that they are willing to overlook present problems in order to fulfill long-term goals.  Conversely, one can counter that a majority of those surveyed support democracy only because no viable alternative currently exists.  Putnam supports the latter in observing, “it is almost always easier for an individual agent to adapt to the existing rules of the game than to seek to change them,” suggesting then that the dissatisfaction of society provides the more accurate depiction of political sentiment.  One cannot easily decipher from the ambiguous information alone as to which analysis is correct.  However, the inclusion of additional data suggests that governmental trust has diminished.[25]

Furthermore, in order for a citizen to support democracy and to act efficaciously, he must trust his government and must fully defend democratic institutions.  Charles Blake provides evidence that the confidence of Argentines in democratic institutions has decreased in the areas of legislature and politicians and has declined considerably (from a 52 percent confidence rating to a 34 percent one) regarding the judiciary from 1988 to 1995.  In comparison to Uruguay, Argentina exhibits consistently lower percentages of democratic support in the areas of the economy, security, poverty, and corruption.  Blake attributes this difference to Argentina’s rapid implementation of a democratic form of government from which officials hoped that a complimentary political culture would emerge.  Unfortunately, evidence indicates that Argentina’s hasty upheaval of previous authoritarian rule along with its immediate implementation of a democratic institution did not provide sufficient time to allow a cultural change that paralleled such a dramatic political one.  As a result, citizens may possess a tendency to support democracy on the sole reason that it is the easiest government to accept presently thus supporting the position that actual levels of democratic support may dip well below 71 percent of the population. [26]  

            One can argue against the aforementioned findings of lack of governmental trust by claiming that Argentina’s tenacity to democracy throughout its political and economic upheavals of the past few years prove that democracy has or will soon be institutionalized.  However, Putnam refers to an interesting theory that refutes such an opposition: Putnam ascertains that just as reciprocity and trust can provide the necessary ties to integrate a society, so can dependence and exploitation.[27]  Therefore, he intimates that a society can actively exist, albeit not as efficiently, without trust.  Thus, while Argentina may have preserved a democratic structure throughout times of crisis, the culture’s lack of social capital and lack of legitimacy indicate that the government has likely remained intact because of corruption rather than reciprocity.  If indeed Argentina’s grip upon democracy lacks the strength of a concerned, liberal political culture and relies upon corruption for its tenacity, one can easily imagine a faltering democratic future and a possible shift from democracy to dictatorship.

 Ultimately, Argentina at the present moment has not given indication that it has normalized democracy among its citizens as shown through its deficit in social capital and in a general sense of support of the government.  While Argentina may not be able to expect a stable, liberal, modern democracy in the near future, political cultures do change with time.  Thus, if Argentina achieves prolonged institutional efficiency coupled with economic stabilization, the Argentine people could potentially overcome the effects of having quickly adopted an institutional democracy without first establishing a participant liberal political culture.